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Abstract: During the Cold War, the strategic significance of Turkey to the United States
was clear: limit the expansion of the Soviet Union and maintain control of the
Dardanelles. For the past decade and a half Western policymakers (US and European)
have sent mixed signals to the Turks as to the importance of Turkey in the region, as a
bridge between East and West, and in the World. Through eight decades of secular rule
Turkey has shown that a democratic and secular state can exist within an almost entirely
Muslim population.
This thesis is made up of five main parts that answer the question — does Turkey
still matter? The first two parts establish a foundation for the discussion and consist o f a
theoretical overview of secularism and a history o f the Turkish state. The remaining
three parts constitute an applied research section consisting of indirect quantitative
analysis, polling data analysis, and direct and indirect interviews. Through this thorough
research o f the modern day issues the thesis question will be answered with a resounding
affirmative.
The evidence shows that Turks, while firmly grounded in Islam, place great
emphasis on other issues: personal freedom, economic opportunity, a moderate and

accepting form o f Islam (18-24 yr grp), and their own family unit (Mutlu 1996).
Although Turkey has issues that must be resolved— the Kurds and Cyprus to name the
two primary ones— the West (primarily the US and Europe) must realize that the
contributions Turkey can make on the world political stage are enormous. As Turkey
continues to modernize and westernize the US and Europe should focus less on what
changes they want Turkey to make and more on the efforts and changes Turkey has
already made. If there is to be peaceful coexistence between Islam and the West, in any
form or to any degree, the secular but unapologetically Muslim state o f Turkey serves as
both a critical partner for the West and as a model for the future o f other Islamic states.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

Turkey has always existed as a place “in-between” : e.xisting at the crossroads of
East and West, Europe and Asia, Europe and the Middle East, past and present. Scholars
postulated that with the end o f the Cold War and the collapse o f the Soviet Union, the
strategic significance of Turkey would begin to taper off. The West no longer needed a
buffer on the Southern shore o f the Black Sea. But Turkey, a secular state whose citizens
are 98% Muslim, is as important today as it ever was. The defining feature of Turkey is
its secularism, which I argue has allowed it to successfully develop and modernize, and if
sustained, will allow it to remain a vital crossroads in the future. Turkey’s youth holds
the key to bridging the gap between a Christian Europe that fears the Middle East and a
Middle East that is suspect of Europe and the West.
Bring Turkey up in a political discussion almost anywhere in Europe today and
you run the risk o f a heated debate. Where does Turkey belong, Europe or Asia? Many
would, and have, posed the question, “Does the internal struggle between the moderate
Islamist ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party and the fiercely secular Kemalist
establishment demonstrate an open and vigorous democracy or does it belie a more
sinister plan for closer ties between Islam and the state?” (Peninsula Press, Dec 2005)
While skeptics warn o f thousands of unemployed Turks waiting on the border to flood
the European market if/when Turkey joins the EU, optimists point to Turkey’s youthful
and eager workforce injecting a sorely needed sense of competition into the market.
“Undeniably, global politics are in flux and Europe, caught in an existential crisis, must
decide whether to embrace the pluralism of the global age or to retreat into itself.”
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(Peninsula Press, Dec 2005) In 2001, former President Clinton underlined the
importance o f Turkey, stating that Turkey was “the key to meeting all the challenges that
remained for Europe.” (Peninsula Press, Dec 2005)

Problem Statem ent
Why did the founder o f modern day Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, risk his life
to create a secular state? He believed that the road to success for his country was three
fold: 1) modernization— via industrialization and accessing the global economy; 2)
Westernization— universal education, health care, and civil rights, to name a few; and 3)
secularization— at a minimum the separation of church and state.
This thesis is an exploration into the Turkish state. My argument is simply this:
Turkey matters. Now, more than any other point in history Turkeys stands in the middle
o f so many issues. The West must realize that the Turks are a proud people with a proud
history. Undeniably, over the last eight decades Turkey has used less than internationally
acceptable means to address its internal problems. However, the W est’s interests are best
served by recognizing that ultimately Turkey’s problems impact the global stage and that
forcing western style solutions may not be appropriate. As we shall see throughout the
course o f this discussion there are many sides to each issue and the actual truth lies
somewhere in between.
Although this is a thesis on Turkey and its primary mission is to fulfill the
requirement for a Masters degree in political science, the author has a vested and applied
interest in this topic. I am a Naval Officer and my next posting will be as the Naval
Attache in Ankara, Turkey. The research I have done for this paper has led to a much
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greater appreciation for and understanding of the country where I will be living for three
years. As the American military representative to the US Ambassador I will be
responsible for political and military policy development. My research over the last two
years will serve as a strong foundation for this work.
It is important to remember that Turkey is its own sovereign nation and ultimately
charts its own course for the betterment of its situation. From the US and international
perspective we must allow Turkey to do just that. If Turkey is alienated by taunting or
condescending rhetoric from the West (as we have seen over recent issues such as human
rights, Cyprus, the Kurds, EU accession, and Iraq) then the West will be the worse for it
in the long run. What I will prove through my three part applied research in chapter four
o f this paper is that Turkey is in fact at the tipping point and both sides, East and West,
need to understand that a strong, secular, EU-admitted Turkey that is free to provide
meaningful dialogue in all her spheres o f influence is the best solution for the world.

Chapter L ayout
This paper is separated into five chapters. Chapter one includes the introduction,
problem statement, and chapter layout.
Chapter two is a theoretical exploration o f secularism from the ancient Greeks to
Western philosophers and finally to its modern manifestation. The goal o f this chapter is
to compare the secularism o f the ancient age to the secularism that Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk, founder o f modern day Turkey, longed to see take shape in his country.
Additionally, I will use John Rawls’ Theory o f Justice (1971) to explore the potential
applicability o f his two basic principles o f justice to the modern secular state o f Turkey.
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Chapter three is a short history of how contemporary Turkey came to be. As this
is not a history paper I will only briefly discuss the expansion and contraction of the
Ottoman Empire over the last several centuries in order to set the stage for Ataturk’s
arrival and policy changes which created a secular state. I will then examine in depth the
life o f Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, looking at how his early life tempered him and prepared
him to lead the revolution, and track his takeover of the government and the ensuing
dramatic changes that took place.
W ith secularism and the history of Turkey established chapter four consists of a
three part applied research into several aspects of modern day Turkey.
First I will explore US, EU, and Turkish foreign policy. I will use the military
planners’ DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) method of analysis.
Before any battle is fought in the US military, the planners turn to the intelligence
community and request an IPB (Intelligence Preparation of the Battle space). The
planners then incorporate the IPB into their DIME analysis to ultimately recommend
CO A ’s (Courses of Action) recommendations to the commander. Our DIME analysis
will serve as a modern-day benchmark of the foreign policy situation in Turkey.
Second, using recent polls of college age students and adults regarding their views
on a variety of issues in their state, I will discuss the current political and religious
environment in modern day Turkey. With the DIME analysis as a foundation, the polling
data reveals to the reader a younger generation of Turks who are more Western, more
tolerant, and more open than their parents. Additional polling data is used to re
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emphasize the key point - that the next generation of Turkey, which makes up a third of
the population, can greatly influence the tipping point.
Third, I will present findings from several interviews to see what the actual policy
makers are saying. This section compares two Turkish perspectives (the Turkish Prime
Minister and the First Secretary o f the Turkish embassy in Washington, DC.) with two
US perspectives (the Joint Staff and Office o f the Secretary of Defense).
Finally I will address two of the biggest issues for Turkey right now, the Kurds
and Cyprus. I will show how analysis o f these two issues presents an excellent snapshot
of the many challenges that face Turkey today.
Chapter five will be the conclusion and policy recommendations. What I hope to
achieve by this point in the paper is to have the reader understand a little of what it means
to be Turkish. Specifically, I want the reader to get a sense of the pride of this nation,
their acute sense o f history, and the importance o f Ataturk to the common citizen. And
ultimately, I want to prove that Turkey matters to the West and to the future direction of
the world. I believe that in the final analysis, Turkey matters because the West needs
Turkey more than Turkey needs the West.
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Chapter 2 - The History of Secularism

Greek P hilosophers
The birth o f Western science, philosophy, rationalism, and secularism can be
traced back to Greek thought. The Greek development o f the knowledge and
understanding o f these fields was marked by contradictory and conflicting views over its
eight centuries of development from the sixth century B. C. to the second century A. D.
Although the Greeks often disagreed on practice, the unifying principle was always
"knowledge, understanding, wisdom and illumination in the exploration of nature and
m an."..."The legacy o f the Greeks to the Western world can be briefly summarized.
They invented the idea o f a secular civilization. All members of the community have the
opportunity to contribute to the intellectual and moral progress o f society; there is no
concept o f a privileged class morally and intellectually superior to the rest" (Ebenstein
2000, 17). But how exactly did this idea come about?
It is in ancient Greece where the very concept of "nature" (physisj is discovered.
As Ebenstein points out the Old Testament does not even contain the word "nature."
Before the Greeks developed this idea, primitive people believed in gods and demons,
they believed the world was an irrational place, and they were concerned about the
individual utility o f things— whether something could help or harm them. The Greeks
rejected the idea that the world was irrational, and believed that with careful scientific
analysis it could be understood— hence we get the term "philosophy," which in Greek
means "love o f knowledge." After deciding nature was rational, the Greeks took the next
logical step and decided that since everything was part of nature, everything was subject
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to the rational laws o f nature. For example, the Greek concept o f religion reflected the
way they saw rationalism and nature. There was no definite line between the Gods and
nature in Greek thought because they saw the divine in nature, whereas the JudeoChristian concept was o f a God being above nature (Ebenstein 2000, 9).
Tracing Greek philosophy of religion is a natural progression that allows us to
understand the Greek concept o f the secular state. In contrast to the later Christian view,
Xenophanes (570-480 B.C.) put forth the idea that man creates God in his own image.
Xenophanes noted that all cultures do this; for example, Ethiopian Gods were black. He
also felt that the path to truth was long, laborious, and not meant for many people (i.e.
only a select few would have the potential to work their way through to enlightenment).
Protagoras (480-411 B.C.), the first of the sophists, continued Xenophanes placement of
man at the center of religion with his famous saying that "man is the measure of all
things" (Ebenstein 2000, 9). This “belief in m an” was the greatest legacy o f this period
and it came to be known as Greek humanism. This pre-Platonic thought process was
significant because for the first time in history man realized not only his potential but also
his limitations. Additionally, man was no longer a "worm of no significance nor was he a
demigod" (Ebenstein 2000, 10).

Plato and A ristotle
Plato's Republic is a lengthy and circuitous dialogue that centers on the question:
is it always better to be just than unjust? As Socrates, Plato's main character in The
Republic, answers this question we see the original idea o f the secular state. Plato was a
strong proponent o f aristocracy and an acute critic of democracy. Religion, for Plato,

was a tool to be used to better mold the people within the state, as the majority o f the
population in the state was incapable o f understanding his concept o f democracy. If
religion could be used to influence the character development of people (i.e. make them
more just) he saw the state becoming stronger for it. Plato's revolutionary belief was that
"the right kind o f government and politics can be the legitimate object of rigorous,
rational analysis, rather than the inevitable product o f muddling through fear and faith,
indolence and improvisation" (Ebenstein 2000, 20). Plato saw in the masses an
incapacity for self-determination or at least in most cases an inability to comprehend his
implicit opposition to democracy. Plato was most interested in creating the best form of
government though rigorous analysis. Although he was intrigued by the possibility of the
democratic state and saw self-determination as something to be desired he^ realized that
man was incapable (possibly even unworthy) o f it.
Aristotle's overall approach to philosophy and politics was more pragmatic than
that o f Plato. For Aristotle there was no universal truth, but rather a more situational
truth that should be evaluated after the moment passed to see how well it held up and
then modified if necessary. As for the form o f government a state should assume,
Aristotle said that legislators should be aware that the ideal was often unattainable and
therefore they should also be aware o f what was actually attainable. While Aristotle
agreed with Plato on the merits o f monarchy and aristocracy and the idea that some were
born to rule and others to be subjugated, he disagreed fundamentally on education and
social structure. Aristotle was a proponent of universal education and felt ruling was a
duty to be shared by all. As for social structure, although Aristotle was a believer in class

and to a certain extent privilege, there was much more flexibility in his theory for a
person to fulfill his aspirations if they had the capability to do so (Ebenstein 2000).
The Greeks and Turks have been enemies for over two thousand years. It is an
interesting point to note that the key aspect that differentiates Turkey from other
predominately Muslim countries in the region— its secularism— was originally a Greek
contribution. The Greek philosophers had differing opinions on number o f issues, but
they usually departed on that discussion from the same place— the importance o f the
state. The departure came after that, on the details of the state. The Greek contribution
o f the idea o f secularism had its roots in the idea o f increasing the overall power o f the
state. That idea, as we shall see, will evolve as secularism develops over the ages but the
basic premise o f the separation o f the church from the state will remain.

E arly Western Thinkers
St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.), St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 A.D.), Marsilio de
Padua (1275-1343 A.D.), and Machiavelli (1469-1527)
Despite what Christians might believe, the history o f Christianity is rife with
Greek philosophy. Specifically the work o f St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Marsilio
de Padua, and Machiavelli built upon the earlier work o f Greek scholars to further
influence the development o f secularism.
St. Augustine called Plato the "most Christian of the pagan philosophers."
Platonic philosophy dictated Christian thought, and by extension Platonic-Augustinian
thought until the beginning o f the thirteenth century. St. Augustine started The City o f
God in 413 A.D. because he was so moved by the pagan attacks that sacked Rome. He
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set out to explore two issues with his book: first, the pagan challenge to Christianity; and
second, the vision o f the heavenly city as contrasted with the earthly city. His views on
the latter relate directly to our discussion of the state and self-determination. St.
Augustine's heavenly city symbolically represented (but was not identical to) the church.
The earthly city is symbolically represented by the state. St. Augustine saw the state as
beneficial as it provided a safer and more stable means with which to serve God. St.
Augustine was primarily concerned with "ways o f life" not with "organizations of life,"
and said that the struggle in the universe was not between the church and the state but
rather between two opposing ways o f life. One criticism of St. Augustine is that he failed
to distinguish between the visible and invisible church, and he claimed rights for one that
he would have not claimed for the other, particularly the relationship to the state. Those
who affirmed the sovereignty of'm undane' rulers over the church used his argument later.
St. Augustine would have likely preferred a theocratic state. However, I think he was
prescient in seeing the issues that lay ahead, because for him what was most important
were for people to live a Christian "way o f life" in the earthly city (Ebenstein 2000).
St. Thomas Aquinas's main treatise, the Summa Theologica (1265), is said to have
sparked the beginning o f the Renaissance, and the rebirth of rationalism, and classical
humanism. His method o f argument in the Summa was that of scholasticism, with
questions and answers allowing him to make key points on the necessity o f government.
St. Thomas had two reasons for the necessity o f government even in the state of
innocence. First, he wrote, "Man is a naturally social being and has a social life."
Second, if one man surpassed another in knowledge or justice it would be a sin to
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disregard such superiority because it was a benefit to all. St. Thomas agrees with
Aristotle that man's social impulse is the origin o f the state, and the founding of it m an’s
purpose. St. Thomas saw the world in hierarchical terms. He stated that in good
government the interest o f the governed is served, in bad government the interests o f the
rulers prevail. He, like Aristotle, was also a believer that a monarchy is better than other
forms o f government because it is difficult to find the necessary qualities o f a good ruler
in more than one man. Again, a theocratic state would have most likely suited St.
Thomas as well, but as we saw with St. Augustine, substance would have been more
important than form (Ebenstein 2000).
Marsilio o f Padua was an Italian physician who also practiced philosophy, law,
and theology. His major work, The Defender o f Peace (1324) is a plea for the
subordination o f the ecclesiastical to the secular power and for the right of the people to
choose their own government. He played a part in the re-establishment of the Roman
republic in 1328. Scholars have said The Defender o f Peace is one of the most original
treatises on political theory produced during the Middle Ages, and that it significantly
influenced the modern idea of the state (Ebenstein 2000). He has been variously
considered a forerunner o f the Protestant Reformation and an architect both o f the
Machiavellian state and o f modern democracy. During his life the Church was
undergoing significant changes. The papacy o f Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303) marks a
turning point in the history o f the church, as he is the last pope to make claims of world
rule. Two o f his papal edicts, Clericis Laicos (1296) and Unam Santum (1302), were
major setbacks for the Catholic Church. Clericis Laicos stated that laymen have no
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jurisdiction over the clergy. Essentially, this edict was an attempt by the Church not to
have to pay taxes. There was significant resistance by the kings o f England and France,
which caused the Pope to lose power and credibility. Unam Santum was his attempt to
re-establish authority by stating that the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church was the one
true path to salvation. Temporal authority was subject to spiritual authority. These edicts
most likely influenced the last section of Marsilio's work. In it, he calls the Church a
coercive authority that does not have the right to rule by edict (Ebenstein 2000).
M achiavelli’s major work is The Prince (1513). The most revolutionary aspect of
The Prince is that prior to Machiavelli everyone, including Plato and Aristotle, had one
central question: the end o f the state. Machiavelli assumes that power is an end in itself
and he confines his inquiry to the means that are best suited to acquire, retain, and expand
power. Machiavelli thus separates power from morality, ethics, and religion, and sets up
the state as an autonomous system of values independent of any other source.
Machiavelli thus develops the idea of the reason of the state: “let a prince therefore aim at
conquering and maintaining the state and the means will always be judged honorable and
praised by every one" (Ebenstein 2000, 296).

For Machiavelli religion was merely

another tool used to influence and control the people.
The early Western thinkers show a progression of thought on the separation of
church and state that is important for our discussion. St. Augustine and St. Thomas
generally believe in a strong state because it sets the best conditions to serve God. The
important point is they both saw God above the state. Marsilio of Padua takes a
significant step towards defining the actual concept of sovereignty and Machiavelli
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makes the point o f power and the state. This break between the church and the state,
albeit for different reasons, marks a completely different type o f thought. Turkey, via
Ataturk, embraced Marsilio's work primarily in the subordination of the ecclesiastical to
the secular power. Religion today in Turkey, as indicated by polling data, is very
important but the state does not exist to provide a place for that religion. The religion
exists as a cultural factor within the state but not tied to the state. Machiavellian thought
contributes to modern day Turkey strictly in terms of power, and as we will see later the
military leadership who is the guardian of Ataturk’s vision is always at the ready to step
in if religion tries to cross into the state.

Peace o f Westphalia
As the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) ended with no clear victor scholars began to
’ question whether moral and physical devastation could be justified by theological
differences. Before we look at the contributions of our scholars from this era we need to
r

examine the war and the significance of the peace. Although the Thirty Years War was
fought between 1618 and 1648 one can easily trace the origins of the conflict to well
before that time and its ramifications to well after it. The peace that ended the conflict
marked several huge changes that had never been seen before.
The Thirty Years War was fought primarily in what is present day Germany and it
involved most o f the major European powers. It was from the outset a religious conflict
between Protestants and Catholics. Sweden, Denmark, Catholic France, Scotland, and
many small German countries like Saxony loosely aligned themselves over time on the
Protestant side and the Holy Roman Empire and Spain were on the Roman Catholic
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Church side. The war was not marked by one battle or siege line with trenches; rather, it
was a series o f revolts, interventions, and alliances marked by generals, bishops and kings
maneuvering on both sides for political and economic power as well as territory. Left in
its wake was pestilence and plague that is estimated to have killed as much as 30 percent
of the population o f Germany. Despite no clear victor at the end o f the war, it did mark
the beginning o f the end o f Spain’s military and political dominance and the beginning of
Bourbon dominance o f France. But what did the peace contribute in the form of the
state? The Peace o f W estphalia aligned citizenry of a respective nation to the laws of that
nation and its government. No longer were citizens subjected to conflicting and
overlapping political and religious loyalties. This treaty, for the first time, put the law of
the state separate, and above, religious law. The law o f the land was the law of the state
and that state’s government, period. In this treaty we see the basic tenets of the sovereign
nation-state. The importance o f the Peace of Westphalia is paramount to our argument
because although there will be small scale religious conflicts, the Thirty Years' War
marked the last major religious war in mainland Europe.

Later Western Thinkers
Hobbes (1588-1679), Locke (1632-1704), Montesquieu (1689-1755), and Rousseau
(1712-1778)
Thomas Hobbes was an English philosopher whose major work, Leviathan, was
written right after the Puritan Revolution (1642-1649), England’s own miniature version
o f the Thirty Years War. It is believed to be the first theory of politics in the English
language. Hobbes was a proponent of absolute government but unlike most defenders of
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this theory Hobbes argued that men are naturally equal in mind and body. This basic
equality o f men is the principle source of trouble and misery. In the state o f nature
Hobbes asserts that men are in a condition of war. Hobbes had a notion of a social
contract but it was made between subjects, not between subject and sovereign. Hobbes
was not a proponent o f religion and saw in the Catholic Church the “true exemplification
o f the kingdom o f darkness” (Ebenstein 2000, 359). Many attribute “might makes right”
and the spiritual fatherhood o f totalitarianism to Hobbes; this is unfair and untrue for
three main reasons. First, Hobbes states that his foundation o f government is a covenant
between rulers and ruled where the ruled give power to the sovereign. Second, Hobbes
assigns the state the job of maintaining order and security for the benefit of its citizens.
Third, Hobbes' theoretical state is authoritarian, not totalitarian. Hobbes was a proponent
o f monarchy but also said the sovereign, whether monarch, aristocrat or democratically
elected leader, should be a Leviathan, an absolute authority (Ebenstein 2000).
In John Locke we see the birth o f rational liberalism. Locke’s The Two Treatises
o f Government marks the first time the rights of people are taken into account in this
mindset o f government and natural law. Locke’s first treatise, fundamentally a rebuttal
o f Sir Robert Filmer, states there is no divinely ordained monarch over the entire world,
and that the natural state o f mankind is anarchy. Locke’s fundamental argument was for
the separation o f church and state, and that for kings to proclaim themselves rulers by
divine right appointed by and carrying out God’s will was absurd. Locke’s attack on
Filmer stemmed from the fact that Filmer, at the time, had the strongest reputation and
argument for a divinely ordained, hereditary, absolute monarchy. Locke basically says
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that since we can never know the true descendants of Adam that Film er’s logic is flawed.
Locke’s second treatise is notable for a number of reasons. It begins with a depiction of
the state o f nature, wherein individuals are under no obligation to obey a ruler but are
each judges o f what the law o f nature requires. It also covers conquest and slavery,
property, representative government, and the right o f revolution. Both the British and
U.S. systems o f government are are based on the Lockean recognition of government by
consent. Locke stated that the government only had duties and the people had the rights.
For Locke there was a natural law that preceded the state, in contrast to Hobbes who felt
that laws followed the state. According to Locke, manmade laws must apply to all, they
must not be arbitrary or oppressive, there must be no tax without the consent of the
people, and the legislature must not transfer law making power to anybody else. Locke
was not only a proponent of self-determination and the secular state, he truly believed in
the right o f people to rebel to get the rights they deserved.
M ontesquieu’s Spirit o f Laws ’ last section is titled Religious Toleration. It is
included below.
We are here politicians, and not divines; but the divines themselves must
allow that there is great difference between tolerating and approving a
religion.
When the legislator has believed it a duty to permit the exercise of many
religions, it is necessary that he should enforce also toleration amongst
these religions themselves. It is a principle that every religion which is
persecuted becomes itself persecuting: for as soon as some accidental turn
it arises from persecution; not as a religion but as a tyranny.
It is necessary, then, that the laws require from several religions, not only
that they shall not embroil the state, but that they shall not raise
disturbances amongst themselves. A citizen does not fulfill the laws by
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not disturbing the government; it is requisite that he should not trouble any
citizen whomsoever (Ebenstein 2000, 421).
An observation o f Montesquieu from my modern, and some would say realist,
point o f view would be that his prescription is easier said than done. His religious
toleration is a solid concept, in theory. The problems arise when you try to put it into
practice.
Jean Jacques Rousseau was born in 1712 in Geneva. He is the only one of our
philosophers to come from a poor family and we see influence o f his background in his
greatest work, The Social Contract. In it Rousseau states that the “sovereignty of the
people is inalienable and indivisible. The people cannot give away, or transfer, to any
other person or body their ultimate right o f self-government, o f deciding their own
destiny” (Ebenstein 2000, 448). Rousseau was the first to attack the very foundations of
his contemporary civilization. He saw the decadence of luxury and the ever expanding
needs o f society (primarily o f the upper class) as the road to demise. In his social .
contract Rousseau revitalizes the organic theory of the state with his concept of General
Will, or common interest that comes from all, applies to all, and cannot be represented by
representative assembly. In essence why Rousseau is important is that he builds upon
the doctrines o f Plato and Aristotle (which emphasized good government at the expense
o f self-government), he draws upon Locke’s emphasis on the liberal school and selfgovernment, and as a result he puts good government hand-in-hand with self-government
with his key concept o f the General Will.
Bentham (1748-1832), Tocqueville (1805-1859), and Mill (1806-1873)
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The case has been made for separation o f church and state, the secular state, and
the right to self-determination. Therefore let us briefly touch on these last three
nineteenth century philosophers and focus solely on how their theories illuminate our
discussion. While the case for secularism has already been made, these three writers
refined and added detail to existing social theory.
Bentham developed the principle of utility, which states the greatest happiness of
the greatest number is the actual measure o f right and wrong; in other words, the greatest
happiness is the highest moral good. Bentham's theories laid the foundation for modern
social programs (i.e. public health systems, national education systems, and labor
organization (Ebenstein 2000).
Alexis de Tocqueville was a Frenchman who wrote Democracy in America.
What appealed most to him about America was its overall fairness and general equality of
conditions. However, what concerned him most about the young country was its people's
difficulty in reconciling individuality and liberty with democratic equality.
“Intellectually,” Tocqueville said, “I have an inclination for democratic institutions...I
love passionately liberty, law, and respect for rights, but not democracy” (Ebenstein
2000, 562). Tocqueville did not have faith that people could make it work in the long
run.
John Stuart Mill wrote On Liberty in which he, like Tocqueville, makes the point
that the journey from tyranny to popular self-rule does not necessarily solve the problem
o f liberty. The tyranny o f society can cut much deeper and leave little room for
individuality (Ebenstein 2000).
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How do these later thinkers contribute? No longer is the church the very center of
discussion. Political thinkers are moving their focus more towards reconciling the rights
o f individuals within the state. What transpired from roughly the 16th to the 19th century
in Europe, as Mill puts it is the journey from tyranny to self-rule. This journey is
ongoing in Turkey today. In the broad perspective the Military (or guardians of
secularism) and the Church (Islam) still challenge each other for what should transpire in
Turkey. The contributions of these later thinkers track the journey of secularism in
Western Europe but they also make another key point applicable to our Turkey
discussion— and that is, attaining self-rule does not necessarily solve all your problems.

R aw ls' Theories and Turkey Today
Rawls' theory— which he often calls “justice as fairness”— is an example o f a
social contract theory. Rawls' ideas share common ground with the social contract
theories o f Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke. Rawls' theory is considered a liberal theory,
meaning primarily that he is in favor of a society which is designed to help out the less
fortunate individuals. The key features o f Rawls' theory are the “original position,” the
“veil o f ignorance”, and the two basic principles o f justice. Rawls’ original position is
simply an idea to help the discussion. It states in essence that people should imagine
themselves without any government and rationally discuss what sort o f government could
be supported by a social contract to achieve justice. Rawls uses the original position not
to justify the authority o f some particular government, but rather to try to figure out what
basic principles should govern any society when it is set up. In the end, Rawls envisions a
society that is not too different from our own. The veil o f ignorance is a mechanism
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within the original position where a person does not know who they are in the real world
and therefore would advocate for the design of a society that helps everyone equally so as
to not end up with a potentially intolerable position for themselves (Rawls 1971).
Raw ls’ Two Basic Principles o f Justice are as follows:
1. Each person should get an equal guarantee to as many different liberties— and as
much o f those liberties— as can be guaranteed to everyone else (Rawls 1971).
2. Inequalities in society are okay only if they are arranged so that the inequalities:
o
o

Actually help out the least fortunate persons in society and (Rawls 1971).
Are connected to positions or offices or jobs in society that everyone has
an equal opportunity to attain (Rawls 1971).

In our world today I believe the most we can hope for is the 'movement' towards
Rawls in a limited sense. Turkey is a good example. By establishing a secular state
Turkey made one law, the law o f the state, the supreme law o f the land. This brought a
level of fairness to all people and removed the oftentimes irrational interpretation of
religious law. The Turks have realized, to a certain degree, that it is not a bad thing when
the law o f the state supersedes religious law; rather, it is a method o f ensuring fairness.
They have also found that they can have a secular state without a marginalization of
religion. The existence o f religious law is acceptable up to the point that it contradicts
the secular law o f the land. Sha‘ria law, for example, calls for cutting off o f a person’s
hand if they are caught stealing, but the actual law of the state calls for a jail sentence if
convicted o f stealing in court. Sha’ria law, in this case, cannot supersede the law of the
state. There are many examples o f the overlapping or conflicting laws (in our country
alone conscientious objectors, and religious apparel while in military uniform come to
mind as issues that are still being resolved). Rawls, I think, would come back to the test
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of fairness. Is the belief or act you are exercising causing unfairness or a marginalization
o f any person or group? If the answer to that question is yes, then the belief or act must
be rethought. Religious freedom should be a goal for any state, and I think Rawls would
agree. The conflict comes when the freedoms enjoyed by the practice o f your religion
infringe on the freedoms o f others within a society.

The path to the secular state in the West was a long journey; some would say it is
not actually over. Turkey is the first state with a population that is almost entirely
Muslim to ever adopt secularism. Will it work? In the principle of'justice as fairness' I
think it is unreasonable to try and incorporate the whole o f A Theory o f Justice into any
modern day state, especially Turkey. This does not mean that we should throw away the
whole idea, as some scholars suggest. The fundamental question is this: what change to a
society, regardless o f how small, could provide an incremental contribution towards a
more fair and just society vis-a-vis Rawls’ theory? An excellent example would be the
situation with the Kurds in Turkey. The Turkish government may deem it not possible to
grant a separate Kurdistan to the Kurds and maybe even autonomy in eastern part o f the
country is a bridge too far, but at least the government is making strides towards treating
the Kurds with the same human rights other Turks get. We will explore this topic in
more detail later.

How does this journey o f secularism through the ages relate to Turkey? How has
secularism, as the West would define it, truly manifested itself in Turkey? In his youth
Ataturk, through his military education and indoctrination into the Napoleonic structure

22

witnessed first hand that a disciplined military run by a chain o f command and not the
will o f a caliphate was most efficient. Additionally, his language training and other
studies, specifically the basic tenants of capitalism, were a window for him into a new
world that he saw as the only path for Turkey’s future. Some would argue that Ataturk,
rather than creating a secular state, created a dictatorship. This is true enough in the
sense that Ataturk did initially rule without opposition and nearly all members of the
parliament and government were of his newly formed party (to which there was no
opposition). As we shall see the secularism that has developed in Turkey may not be
textbook but it works for Turkey and is still necessary in the form that it has taken.
Ataturk in the last two decades of his lifetime achieved what took nearly two thousand
years in Western Europe.
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Chapter 3 - History of Turkey

The Ottoman E m pire
Modern day Turkey is roughly the size of Texas and Oklahoma combined
(301,303 square miles). The estimated population in 2005 was 69,661,000 with a growth
rate o f 1.1 percent. In 2000, 65% of the population lived in urban areas compared to 27%
in 1960 (LOC 2006). Those are just a few o f the modern day numbers, but the Anatolian
peninsula that confines modern day Turkey is the remnant of what was once the great
Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman Empire existed from 1299 until 1922, reaching its greatest size at
the end o f the 17th century. When the Ottomans were at their most powerful the breadth
o f the empire encompassed the entire north coast of Africa, the Balkans, the southeastern
part o f Europe to the Caucasus and all of Anatolia. It is the longest reigning dynasty in
world history.
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F igure 1: Expansion o f the O ttom an E m pire
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Much like the Roman Empire the Ottomans used a policy of assimilation over
time versus total submission at the time o f conquest. When the Ottomans conquered a
new land they would continue to allow the inhabitants to practice whatever religion they
wanted and as long as a small tithe was surrendered the conquered peoples were allowed
to carry on unmolested. Over time the general appeal of Islam coupled with the
infighting between Eastern and Western Christianity led most people to convert to Islam.
The end o f the Ottoman Empire was a direct result of the outcome o f World War I as the
Ottomans were on the side of the Central Powers. Additionally, the Empire suffered
from a great deal o f infighting and power struggles during its later years.
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There were four main phases o f the empire: growth, stagnation, decline, and
dissolution. The growth period, which took place from the m id-15th to the late 17th
century, saw the empire expand to its greatest size. The Empire was finally put in check
by a consortium of European Allies at the Battle o f Vienna in the year 1683. Christian
leaders at this time saw this as a religious war where they were fighting for the survival
o f Christianity. This marked the beginning of the period o f stagnation. During the
decline, from the late 17th century to the early 19th century, the Empire suffered some
consolidation o f its territory in the Balkans and spent this period fighting to hold on to its
gains, mostly against the Russians (Mango 2000).
Figure 2: D ecline o f the O ttom an E m pire._________ ____________________________
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It was also during the end of this time period, in the late 19th century, that the first rise of
nationalism was seen in the empire. Scholars have asserted that quite possibly the rise o f
Pluralism (or the toleration o f many ethnic, cultural, political and religious groups) in the
Christian realms on borders of the empire over a long period of time eventually bled over
and contributed to this nationalism (Heper 1991). We will explore this in more detail in
the discussion o f Ataturk. The final dissolution of the Ottoman Empire arguably comes
on October 29, 1923, the day that the Republic of Turkey is founded. In truth, the
beginning o f the end happens in 1907 with the creation of the “Young Turks,” a
nationalist movement formed by military academy students, whose goal was to take over
the government. The Young Turks and subsequent nationalist organizations set the stage
for Ataturk5s rise to prominence. Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire was great and vast but
in the end, like all other great empires that have come and gone, it was ready and primed
for a change and Ataturk emerged victorious as the one to lead that change. Importantly,
with the end o f the Ottoman Empire also comes the end of the caliphate or rule of the
country by a religious leader.

A tatu rk
M ustafa Kemal Ataturk was born as simply M ustafa in the winter o f 1881 in the
town o f Salonica in what is today Greece. He was born to a middle-class Muslim family
and the name he was given means “the chosen55 (Wagner 2003). At the age of 12 he
secretly took the entrance exams to join the military academy, was accepted and once his
mother finally relented he was allowed to embark on a career that would change his life
and the fate o f his country. During his schooling a math teacher gave him the nickname
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Kemal or “perfection” because o f his impressive skill at solving problems. In 1899,
Mustafa completed military high school and went on to enter infantry school at Istanbul’s
War College, This is an important time in his life because it is here that he makes
lifelong friends that will remain loyal throughout the revolution to come (Wagner 2003).
In i907, after serving two years of arduous duty in Damascus, Syria, Mustafa receives
orders back to in his hometown of Salonica. It is at this, time that the Young Turks seize
power for the first time. Although this is a short-lived coup it marks the beginning of the
end for the sultan. The Young Turks movement is rapidly crushed as many members are
rounded up and hung, but the organization serves as the catalyst for the creation of a new
group called the Committee o f Union and Progress (C.U.P.) formed by many of
M ustafa’s old friends from military school. Mustafa joins the group but finds him self not
in their leadership plans as he is again deployed for much of the following year (Zurcher
2004).
Between this first rebellion and the end of World War I for the Ottoman Empire,
which occurred on October 30, 1918, several key events took place that set the stage for
both Turkey and Mustafa Kemal:
• April 12, 1909: The C.U.P. finds itself on the brink of disaster as the government
orders troops to Istanbul to put down an uprising. The troops instead launch a
mutiny. The C.U.P. restores order and after finding out that the sultan had, in
part, endorsed the rebellion, force him to step down (Wagner 2003).
• June 28, 1914: World War I breaks out and the Ottoman Empire sides with
Germany after concluding that if the Germans won, the Empire would become a
province in Germany and if the Germans lost, the Empire would disappear
(Wagner 2003).
• April 25, 1915: The Battle of Gallipoli starts. Mustafa commands troops on the
high ground despite being outnumbered 4 to 1 manages to hold off attacks by the
Allied forces for eight months to seize the peninsula. He returns to Istanbul to
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find the reinstated sultan and C.U.P. generals taking credit for his
accomplishments (Volkan 1984).
After the war the Allies break the Ottoman Empire into pieces. (Syria, Egypt,
Palestine, Saudi Arabia, etc.) All that is left of the former Ottoman Empire is the
Anatolian Peninsula, Turkey, which is occupied by British forces. In what will become a
pivotal moment for Mustafa, instead of being arrested as a traitor to the Allies, he is sent
to quell a rebellion by local Turks in an area of Turkey called Izmir, which the British
have given to the Greeks. However, he does just the opposite and assists in the rebellion
against the Greeks. He then resigns from the military and begins to form what will
become the “Nationalist” side o f a brewing civil war. The Allies put the final match to
the powder keg in the form o f the Treaty o f Sevres, which was signed by the Ottoman
Government on April 26, 1920. The treaty would have essentially meant the end of the
Turkish nation in that not only would it have dissolved all of the gains of the Ottoman
Empire over the centuries, it would have also cut up most o f the Anatolian peninsula and
left the Turks with almost no country. Mustafa Kemal and his rebels use the treaty as an
occasion to declare themselves the rightful government and the support they get is
overwhelming. The Allies shortsightedly respond with Greek troops, who are the worst
historical enemies o f the Turks. M ustafa’s rebellion emerges victorious and on July 23,
1923, after eight long months o f negotiations with the Allies Mustafa Kemal signs the
Treaty o f Lausanne that basically set the boundaries for what makes up modern Turkey
today (Wagner 2003).
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The only thing left to complete the beginning o f modern day Turkey was the
elimination o f the caliph who had traditionally served the role of both political leader of
the nation and religious leader o f the Muslim faith. The caliph is also said to be a
descendant o f the prophet Mohammed himself. On November 1, 1922, the National
Assembly passed a resolution ending the rule o f government by a member o f the royal
family, thus making Turkey a secular state. On October 23, 1923, Turkey became a
republic with the election o f Mustafa Kemal by the National Assembly by a unanimous
vote o f 158-0 (Wagner 2003).
Over next few years M ustafa Kemal begins a series o f reforms that were both
sweeping and radical, including:
• A new capital city. To mark a true break from the Ottoman Empire Mustafa
Kemal moved the capital from Istanbul to a more centrally located Ankara.
• Religious schools and colleges were closed and replaced by Western style
schools. Additionally, court judges were no longer trained in holy (Sha’ria) law.
• The tall red “fez” hat, a symbol o f Turks, was outlawed and women were
discouraged from wearing veils. Additionally, public employees were required to
wear Western style suits made by local merchants.
• The Christian calendar was introduced as well as the 24-hour clock.
• Women were allowed to walk in the street, drive cars, obtain divorces, teach in
school, and marry non-Muslim men. These changes in woman's rights marked
the most fundamental and contentious break from the Muslim faith.
• The elimination from the constitution of the phrase “The religion of the Turkish
state is Islam” (Wagner 2003).
• Finally, the last break from the Arabic world was the replacement of the 28 letter
Arabic alphabet by a 26 letter Latin based alphabet and a totally new language,
modern Turkish.
The changes were not all popular or even in some cases initially widely accepted;
however, importantly, they all stuck. Mustafa Kemal won a landslide reelection in 1927,
and after passing another sweeping reform that all Turks must take a last name, in one
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further break with the Muslim tradition towards Westernization, he took the last name of
Ataturk or ‘Father Turk’.

World War II and B eyond
Turkey maintained its neutrality during World War II because of its weakened
state due to civil war. However, in 1945 it declared war on Germany to ensure it status
as a charter UN member. From the end o f World War II to the most recent elections in
Turkey much has happened:
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Turkey transitions to a multi-party democracy. Prime Minister (PM) Adnan
Menderes o f the Democratic Party (not Ataturk's party) wins, creating a more
authoritarian government and an economy marked by high inflation.
1952. Turkey joins NATO.
PM Menderes is replaced by the military, which considers itself the guardian
o f Ataturk's secular principles. This military government lasts for four years.
1965. The Justice Party (successor to the Democratic Party) wins election and
PM Suleyman Demirel forms a one-party government.
1980. The military seize control of the government again after political and
sectarian violence cause untenable economic conditions.
1982. New constitution ratified.
1993. First female PM, Tansu Ciller, initiates wide privatization programs
with mixed success.
1997. Next PM Necmettin Erbakan of the newly formed Islamic
fundamentalist Welfare Party is forced out o f power by the military for
increasing the power of Islamic institutions.

P olitical Parties, Coups, and Islam
There are many ways political scientists describe the structure o f the history of
modern Turkey. Two o f the most popular labels for what is basically the same
phenomenon are the Ataturk and post-Ataturk school o f thought and the pre- and post
multiple party periods in Turkey. The major difference between the former and the later
is the purity o f the secularism. During Ataturk’s lifetime the true reasons for a move
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towards a secular state were modernization, science, and reason. Ataturk's education and
life experience taught him that the road to modernization was through westernization, and
he knew that was the only answer for a Turkey that wanted to exist and compete in the
twentieth century (Volkan 1984). I was unable to find in any o f my research any
condemnation o f Islam by Ataturk, he simply said the “truest guide in life was science”
(Heper 1991).
What has kept Turkey poised and ready, perpetually at the tipping point but never
quite completely fulfilling Ataturk’s vision, is the emergence o f political parties which
have ultimately caused a de-secularization of Turkey and a return to a religious state as
their goal. The transition to a multi-party system in the 1940's was a logical and
necessary step for Turkey to make and the system has functioned reasonably well, but
arguably the form it currently takes today is not the vision that Ataturk had for it those
many decades ago. Heper describes this best in his article, "The State, Religion and
Pluralism: The Turkish case in Comparative Perspective." Heper says that the elites who
carried on the Ataturkian approach to politics after he passed away gradually substituted
religious ideology for Ataturk's view of enlightenment and science. Consequently, for
the last fifty years Turkey’s political parties have slowly drifted away from pure politics
and have begun to use politics as a means to a religious end. As mentioned earlier in this
paper, the one element o f Turkish society that has never strayed from Ataturk’s vision—
the military— has intervened three times to oust parties and governments that have taken
religion too far in Turkey. "Each time the military intervened in polities, in 1960-1961
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and 1970-1973, and to a lesser extent in 1980-1983, they tried to restructure democracy
to so that presumably more rationality would be injected into it” (Heper 1991).
To further understand the politics o f the country we must look at a few o f the
major political parties, find out how they came to be, and explore the basics of where
they stand.
The party currently in power is the Justice and Development Party. Its initials are
AKP (from the Turkish Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi). The party claims to be moderate,
right-wing and conservative but with many of its members having strong Islamist roots
some are not willing to truly believe their pro-Western, pro-EU, mainstream agenda.
Specifically of concern, when the AKP was founded in 2001 some of its members split
away and formed the Felicity Party, which is known for Islamic fundamentalism. Many
outsiders wonder if some fundamentalists chose to stay in the AKP and go underground
within the newly formed AKP to bide their time for the future (Mango 2000). In the most
recent election the AKP received 34% of the popular vote giving them 363 of the 550
seat Turkish Parliament (66%). With this majority the leader o f their party, Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, became the Prime Minister.
The main opposition party is the Republican People's Party or CHP (from the
Turkish Cumhuriyet Halt Partisi). The party ideology is a social democratic and secular
Turkish nationalist political party. The party was founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk on
September 9th, 1923, and was the only party in Turkey until the end o f World War II. In
the last election the CHP emerged second with 19% o f the vote giving them 178 seats in
the Turkish Parliament (32%). The leader o f the CHP is Deniz Baykal and the party's
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main source o f strength comes from the middle and upper class and the civil service and
the military. The CHP sees themselves as the true historical party o f a secular Turkey,
which is not disputed by the AKP. Rather, the AKP counters that they are also secular
and are the party o f the future.
In the Turkish Parliament a party must get at least 10% o f the vote to have a
presence. In the last election Independents got 10% o f the vote and obtained 9 seats.
Other than that the entire body is made up o f the AKP majority and the CHP opposition.
The two other parties that currently do not have a presence in the Parliament but that play
an important role in the popular vote and politics are the DYP and MHP (Mango 2000).
The DYP or True Path Party (Turkish - Dogru Yol Partisi) was established by
former Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel in 1983. Prior to the most recent election on
November 3rd, 2002, the DYP controlled 81 seats in Parliament, but they lost all presence
in the 2002 election because they only received 9% of the popular vote. The DYP is a
right-wing secularist conservative party. On the political spectrum, they are seen as
somewhere in between the AKP and CHP. They are secular but have a little more
relaxed feeling about it. The DYP in its former life was called the DP (Democratic Party)
and they were the party in power in 1960 when the military stepped in for the first time to
restore secularism (Zurcher 2004).
The last party o f significance in Turkey today is the MHP or Nationalist
Movement Party (Turkish - Milliyetci Hareket Partisi). Prior to the most recent election
the MHP held 124 seats in Parliament but that representation declined to zero because the
party only got 8% o f the popular vote (Zurcher 2006). The MHP was the party in power
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under Prime Minister Develet Bahceli during the m ilitary’s most recent intervention in
1980. The MHP came to power by appealing to lower class Turks, promising a better life
through Islamic doctrine and encouraging them to believe that their position in life was
due to Turkey's nationalism and a turning away from God.
One frightening thing that occurred in the 1980's after the last military coup was
that the historic brand of Ataturkism or idealism was not so vigorously re-injected back
into the parties as a political manifesto. "The consequence of this has been a softening of
attitudes regarding secularism" (Heper 1991). Do I think the military, in its present state,
will ever allow a fundamentalist form of Islam to take power, or even get more than a
small fringe slice o f a following, in today's Turkey? No. However, the result o f this
“softening” is a Turkey that is constantly on the edge o f a tipping point, but is incapable
o f taking the final step toward a permanent secularism. Instead it has to settle for a
consolidation o f pluralism, usually forced, but sometimes by choice, "reinforced by a less
conflictual relationship between the State and religion." Heper adds that the separation
that Turkey has managed, while not optimal, is still much better than that achieved by
other Middle Eastern regimes.
The tipping point for Turkey will be resolved when the practitioners o f moderate
Islam in Turkey are able to visualize and then verbalize the essential linkage between
Islam and secularization. They will have to acknowledge that while the two are
undeniably linked, there does not necessarily have to be a choice of one or the other.
Rather, the fundamental question they must address and resolve is how the two will
coexist. A quote from M adan’s speech at the Fulbright fortieth anniversary further
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illustrates this point: "Scholars from Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch to Peter Berger and
Louis Dumont have in their different ways pointed to the essential linkages among
Protestantism, individualism, and secularization. Max Weber made a poignant statement
that ‘the fate o f our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and,
above all, by the disenchantment of the world.' Precisely the ultimate and most sublime
values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life of
into the brotherliness o f direct and personal relations." Or to use Peter Berger's succinct
summing up, "Protestantism cut the umbilical cord between heaven and earth." What is
now needed in the Muslim world is an intellectual revolution and a realization that the
same umbilical cord needs to be cut. This would not mean an end to Islam, rather a
starting point to allow Islam to exist apart from the state.
Let's look at it from the global perspective for a moment always keeping in mind
the question "How could Turkey provide the tipping point in the world today?" The fact
of the matter is, as Thomas Friedman succinctly describes it in his most recent book, The
World is Flat, the world is flattening (globalizing) at a rapid pace and people that don't
get onboard will be left behind. Friedman uses a term in his book called "glocalize."
Which basically means how outward is your culture? To what degree is it open to
foreign influences and ideas? In his analysis of why Muslim countries are struggling as
the world goes flat is "because you start tending to respect people for their talent and their
abilities. When you are chatting with another developer in another part o f the world, you
don't know what his or her color is. You are dealing with people on the basis o f talentnot race or ethnicity- and that changes, subtly, over time your whole view o f human
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beings, if you in this talent-based and performance-based world rather than a
background-based world" (Friedman 2005). Friedman points out that the secular Muslim
countries are not struggling as much but for complicated cultural and historical reasons
many o f them don't glocalize well. A good example is the whole tribal mind-set of BinLadenism, which is to purge Saudi Arabia o f all foreigners and foreign influence.
It may seem as if we are crossing the streams here (secular Muslim and ArabMuslim) the important corollary here is that the fundamental form of Islam that we see in
Arab-Muslim countries today does, in fact, exist in Turkey today but it is kept for the
most part in check by a military that will not allow it to grow but it continues to merely
cut off the flower without killing the root. The tipping point comes when Turks truly
realize the key to their future is through Westernization and globalization and they show
their Arab brothers that they can still do that and be Muslim at the same time (Friedman
2005).
Friedman uses an excellent example o f how the tipping point, in this case the
opportunities created by secularism, has affected the Muslim population of India. At 150
million people, India is second only to Indonesia in terms o f the size o f its Muslim
population. With a Muslim population that large one would think that they would have
the same post-9/11 problem that other nations with large Muslim populations have had.
But Friedman points out there are no Indian Muslims at Guantanamo Bay, and there have
been no Indian Muslims found with ties to al-Qaeda or found fighting in Iraq. Why?
Because o f their economic opportunities in India.
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India, like Turkey, enjoys a large Muslim population and a relatively long
sustained democracy. But India enjoys a bit less volatile and historically strategic
position with respect to the crossroads of religion. Indian Muslims still suffer from
discrimination and persecution in the largely Hindu state but despite the problems one
message Irom the Indian government has gotten through to the Muslim Indians - if you
have talent and can provide something to the advancement o f our economy, then the
opportunities to advance exist (Friedman 2005).
In countries where Islam has a repressive hold on society we tend to see the lack
o f opportunity manifest itself in protest or blame, but in places like Turkey and India we
see the possibility, via the pluralistic democratic state, where the true meaning o f the
vision can escape, if allowed to. A quote from The World is Flat:

On November 15, 2003, the two main synagogues o f Istanbul were hit by
some fringe suicide bombers. I happened to be in Istanbul a few months
later, when they reopened. Several things struck me. To begin with, the
chief rabbi appeared at the ceremony, hand in hand with the top Muslim
cleric o f Istanbul and the local mayor, while crowds in the street threw red
carnations on them both. Second, the prime minister of Turkey, Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, who comes from an Islamic party, paid a visit to the
chief rabbi in his office- the first time a Turkish prime minister had ever
called on the chief rabbi. Lastly, the father o f one of the suicide bombers
told the Turkish newspaper Zaman, "We cannot understand why this child
had done the thing he had done...First let us meet with the rabbi of our
Jewish brothers. Let me hug him. Let me kiss his hands and flowing
robe. Let me apologize in the name of my son and offer my condolences
for the deaths...We will be damned if we do not reconcile with them."

Ataturk took a careful and measured approach to balancing religion and with his
secular goals. Nowhere in any o f Ataturk’s writings or speeches was there ever a
condemnation o f Islam. Ataturk was raised a Muslim and although he turned less devout

38

towards the latter part o f his life he never condemned the religion. He only stated that the
true path for advancement for the Turkish government was through the secular state.
This ability to walk the line between the church and state serves as a powerful model for
other Islamic states that might wonder how to achieve more economic success while still
adhering to their religion. Because in any society, it is only through economic
opportunity that people can realize their full potential and turn away from the seductive
and destructive call to blame others for spiritual, economic, and cultural poverty.
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Chapter 4 - Turkey Today
Thus far the paper has laid a foundation to better understand the next section;
namely, the three pillars o f applied research o f modern day Turkey: the DIME analysis,
the polling data, and the review o f interview data.
DIME Analysis

US Foreign P olicy Towards Turkey
This survey section is not intended to be a discussion of the finer points o f U.S.
engagement with Turkey, nor is it a discussion o f what the US policy should or should
not be. Instead, it is a review o f the actual policy documents that create a policy position:
how we engage political to political (POL-POL), political to military (POL-MIL), and
military to military (MIL-MIL). This section will use the DIME method o f analysis to
analyze US, EU, and Turkish foreign policy. The DIME method is a military analyst's
term that summarizes the instruments of national power for a country in question. It
comes from Joint Publication 1 (JP-1) which is titled "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces
o f the United States." It is important to realize that when the US fights wars and even
when it tries to influence other countries, it does so jointly— that is, with all the services.
The services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) merely organize, train, and equip the
force; the joint force commander takes the force to war (JP-1).
How did the U.S. originally become involved in Turkey? At first glance it seems
to be a country and a region that we would be content to let the European powers
influence with their foreign policy. This was true up to a certain p o in t... and that point,
was right after WWII.
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On February 21, 1947, the U.S. government was informed by the British
government that by April 1 it would have to discontinue, because o f its
own difficulties, its military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. It
hoped the United States could take over the burden in both countries.
President Truman and the State, War and Navy Departments at once
realized that unless the United States did so, Greece would be taken over
by its communist partisans strongly supported by the Soviet government
working through the communist Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments;
that if this happened Turkey would find itself in an untenable position in
spite in spite o f its large but antiquated army; and that the eastern
Mediterranean and the Near East in that event would inevitably fall under
communist domination. In a dramatic message to Congress on March 12,
1947, President Truman said that the U.S. must take immediate and
resolute action to support Greece and Turkey. The Congress, after
extensive hearings, approved this historic change in U.S. foreign policy in
a bill signed May 22, known as Public Law 75. Out o f the President's
message came the Truman Doctrine. The principle o f assistance to
countries o f the free world under the threat of communist aggression
having been accepted by the Congress, the Marshall Plan followed not
long after. The military and economic aid given Turkey in the ensuing
years was highly effective: the U.S. probably received more per dollar
advanced than any other country, at least for the period o f this study—
which ends with the signing o f the CENTO (Baghdad) Pact in 1955
(Satterth waite 1972).

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S.-Turkey relations have continued to be strong
and the U.S. considers Turkey one o f its most faithful allies in the,region.
D: Diplomatic
Before we begin the DIME analysis in earnest, a few sentences on the process.
When the military plans for any action or campaign they first plan out what their intent is.
The method planners use to formulate their IPB (Intelligence Preparation o f the
Battlefield). Once planners formulate their IPB they then come up with COA's (Courses
o f Action), usually three, which they then present to the Commander for decision. All of
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this begins with a thorough DIME analysis o f the adversary's instruments o f national
power.
The U.S. diplomatic relations with a foreign government reside in the Executive
branch, and within the Executive branch it is the State Department that sets the policy for
diplomacy. The U.S. has embassies in most countries that serve as the “boots on the
ground” administrators o f foreign policy. Oftentimes they help to create most of what the
foreign policy will be for a country. Each year embassies, in conjunction with the host
nation, publish a shared vision document setting the proposed course for relations (See
Appendix. I). Although this is a somewhat political document and contains a wish list for
each respective country (hence the term ‘shared vision’) it is not created in a vacuum as it
is vetted against relevant military and legislative policy. The most recent TurkishAmerican shared vision statement was published in July of 2006. The document is
broken into two sections: shared vision and structured dialogue. The shared vision
section reiterates the long-standing relationship between the US and Turkey, and states
that both countries have a mutual respect for each other and share the same regional and
global objectives. The shared vision statement goes into detail to actually name the
issues that both countries pledge to work together on; for example: WMD proliferation,
the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Iran’s nuclear program.
The structured dialogue section delineates the various consultation channels the
two countries have developed over time and how they will continue to be used to broaden
the dialogue between them. An example o f two o f the more established channels is the
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High-Level Defense Group (HLDG) and the Economic Cooperation Partnership Council
(ECPC).
The Turkish-American shared vision statement is a written proclamation that we
not only continue to support Turkey's presence in the region, but that we also support
Turkey's unique position and will do what we can as a country to see its increased
influence used as a stabilizing effect.

I: Information
With respect to the flow of information, the U.S. has no equal. On both the
civilian and government side our vast network o f satellites, cable networks, and media
infrastructure remains unmatched. The problem with information in the US is rarely that
there too little o f it, rather there is so much that it is often difficult to sort through the
chaff and find the relevant data. Additionally, the ability for special interests to lobby in
the U.S. is unmatched anywhere in the world. The ability for lobbyists to get their
message onto the world stage and attempt to sway not only the U.S. position on an issue
but also the world position on an issue is sometimes frightening. The fact remains that
the various lnformation Operations campaigns (whether they are lobbyists, military, or
political) that are ongoing in the U.S. with respect to an issue, and Turkey is no
exception, do not always have the best interests of the target country in mind. The
permanent campaign is not merely a phenomenon.
M: Military'
There are five major documents, of various classification levels, that make up the
policy guidance the U.S. military uses to set its agenda for interaction with other
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countries. Each one o f theses documents, in their most recent edition, state that the
United States is a nation at war. Let's look at each of them, in order of precedence.
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the President’s overall policy of
engagement with other countries. Its main purpose is the national security of the United
States and its secondary purpose is to support the promotion of democracy, liberty, and
justice around the world. It is an unclassified document and the most recent one was
released in March o f 2006. The NSS is broken up into eleven chapters, nine of which the
President views as “musts” for the United States (NSS March 2006). These nine are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Champion aspirations for human dignity.
Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks
against us and our friends.
Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.
Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with
weapons o f mass destruction (WMD).
Ignite a new era o f global economic growth through free markets and free trade.
Expand the circle o f development by opening societies and building the
infrastructure o f democracy.
Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.
Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and
opportunities o f the 21st century.
Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges o f globalization (NSS
March 2006).

The National Defense Strategy o f the United States o f America (NDS) is also an
unclassified document; it is written by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and issued by
the Department o f Defense (DoD). The NDS is the SecD ef s strategy to meet the goals
set forth by the President's NSS. The most recent NDS was published in March 2005.
The SecDef uses four key words in the NDS to explain how the U.S. military will
accomplish the President's objectives (NDS, March 2005). These four key words are:
•

A ssure allies and friends. We will provide assurance by demonstrating our
resolve to fulfill our alliance and other defense commitments and help protect
common interests.
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Dissuade potential adversaries. We will work to dissuade potential adversaries
from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, particularly by
developing our own key military advantages.
• ,/ Deter aggression and counter coercion. We will deter by maintaining capable
and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the
will to resolve conflicts decisively on favorable terms.
• Defeat adversaries. At the direction o f the President, we will defeat adversaries
at the time, place, and in the manner o f our choosing— setting the conditions for
future security (NDS, March 2005).
•

The National M ilitary Strategy o f the United States o f America (NMS) is a
SECRET/NOFORN document written by the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS). The most recent NMS is dated March 2004 and in it the Chairman succinctly
writes in his forward the purpose of the document. "The NMS conveys my message to
the Joint Force on the strategic direction o f the Armed Forces o f the United States should
follow to support the National Security (NSS) and Defense Strategies (NDS) in time of
war. These documents describe the ways and means to protect the United States, prevent
conflict and surprise attack and prevail against adversaries who threaten our homeland,
deployed forces, allies and friends..

The Chairman sets three specific priorities to

achieve this success:
•
•
•

Win the War on Terrorism.
Enhance our ability to fight as a joint force.
Transform the Armed forces (NMS March 2004).
The Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) is another DoD document signed by

the SecDef. Security cooperation is defined as the means by which the DoD encourages
and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives.
The document is classified secret but is releasable to the UK and Australia. The SCG is
the vehicle the SecDef uses to set priorities for creating new partnerships and building the
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capacity o f existing partnerships. In the SCG the SecDef makes a point that it is essential
that DoD coordinate their efforts across the whole of U.S. Government, especially the
Department o f State (DoS). The most recent SCG is November 2005 (SCG November
2005).
The United States European Command Theater Security Cooperation Strategy
(EUCOM TSCS) is a secret document signed by the four star flag officer in charge of
EUCOM. EUCOM is one o f nine unified commands in the U.S. military. The five
geographic commands are listed on the map below. Additionally, there are four
functional unified commands, which are: STRATCOM or Strategic Command, SOCOM
or Special Operations Command, JFCOM or Joint Forces Command, and TRANSCOM
or Transportation C om m and.. In the EUCOM TSCS the commander delineates the type
of engagement, country by country, his command plans to engage in to support all of the
above documents. This is a much more detailed document than the previous four in that
the theater security cooperation strategy is where the rubber meets the road; this is the
specific document that is supposed to tell how to get the job done (EUCOM TSCS April
2006).
The various vehicles for MIL-MIL engagement between the U.S. and Turkey are
relatively clear; there are two factors that sometimes work to impede their
implementation. First and foremost is implementation. Commanders charged with
implementing these plans are forced to interpret them; their interpretation often produces
different actions than those intended by the author. Second is the military posting cycle.
One undeniable fact is that policy takes time. Most members of the military serve at a
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particular duty station for only three years at time before moving on. This often causes a
continuity problem for policy implementation.
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E: Economic
The formulation o f our economic foreign policy comes from both the legislative
and the executive branch. Turkey's trade relevance as a part o f our policy has been
increasing steadily over the last few years. Here is a snapshot of the most recent numbers
of Turkey's trade with the U.S.:
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T able 1: T urkey's E xp ort-lm p ort to the US

Total Exports (bn)
Exports to U.S.
US Share in
Exports
Total Imports (bn)
Imports from U.S.
US Share in
imports

2002
35.1 bn
3.2 bn

2003
46.8 bn
3.7 bn

2004
63.1 bn
4.9 bn

2005v
73.1 bn
4.9 bn

2006
10.8*
0.9*

9.20%
5Q.3 bn
3.1 bn

8.00%
68.7 bn
3.4 bn

7.80%
97.5 bn
4.7 bn

6.70%
116 bn
5.3 bn

7.9%*
17.8*
0.8*

6.00%

5.00%

4.80%
4.60%
4.4%*
* = Jan + Feb 2006 data only

Source: US E m bassy, A nkara

For the last two decades, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. agenda on
foreign policy economics has been that o f geoeconomics instead o f geopolitics.
Geopolitics is the interaction of national economies within the world economy. U.S.
foreign economic policy is highly fragmented with Congress having the “power o f the
purse” and the President having the power to initiate trade agreements.

There is a

constant tug of war as to who is in charge as different agencies assume leadership roles in
the setting o f policy. Members o f Congress are usually looking out for the best interests
of their district, state, and party (not necessarily in that order); while the President
typically boasts that he is looking out for the best interests of the country. In reality, the
setting of foreign policy is complicated by the influence of lobbyists, big businesses, and
global corporations— it is sometimes difficult to know who is ultimately pulling the
strings behind the scene as U.S. economic policy is made.

E uropean Foreign P olicy Towards Turkey
D: Diplomatic
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In 1992, the Treaty on European Union formally established the European Union
(EU). It is an intergovernmental and supranational union currently made up of 25
member states.
Figure 4: EU M em bership Snapshot
Member Stares
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Many aspects o f the Union have existed through earlier relationships dating as far back as
1951. It is referred to as a union because it is not a sovereign nation or state but rather an
agreed upon set o f institutions. For example, the Union currently has one common single
market that consists o f a customs union and a single currency (adopted so far by 12 of 25
members) managed by the European Bank. They have a common trade, fisheries,
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agricultural, and foreign and security policy. The most important institution within the
EU is the European Parliament, which dates back to 1950. The founding treaties, the
Council o f the European Union, European Commission, the European Court o f Justice,
and the European Central Bank also rank highly in importance. The EU, on the whole,
has strong trade relations with Turkey which have been increasing steadily over the last
few years. Germany has the highest level o f trade with Turkey of any EU member.
Additionally, foreign direct investment from the EU is Turkey’s largest source of
investment. The EU made a concerted effort to make this happen in 2002.
I: Information
Not far behind the U.S. in its ability to generate information is the EU. The EU
has the global reputation of a watchdog to both break down barriers to new entry into the
communications industry and to have a much more open and critical media with respect
to government policies. The information challenge the EU faces on most issues is
competing agendas between individual country members within the EU.
M: Military
Europe is made up o f many different sovereign countries, each with their own
military and doctrine. This portion of the survey discusses the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and how the organization drives military foreign policy in Europe.
The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty commonly referred to as the Treaty o f Washington,
established NATO. There were originally 12 member states, with the number growing to
16 by the end o f the Cold War. By 2004 the number o f member states had grown to 26
(NATO 1996).
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Figure 5: N A TO M em bership
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The U.S. is one o f the founding members o f NATO and has by far the largest military
footprint. Some would argue that NATO today is merely a tool the U.S. uses to filter its
hegemony into Europe via willing accomplices. However, for the purposes of this paper,
we will restrict the discussion to explaining how the organization works. In accordance
with the Treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security
o f its member countries by political and military means. Founded primarily to counter
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the Soviet threat during the Cold War, NATO was extremely successful. In 1991 NATO
began a transformation designed to establish close security links with the states in Central
and Eastern Europe, which were former members of the Soviet led W arsaw Pact. All
member nations o f NATO contribute forces in one form or another. NATO has its own
separate military doctrine and policy (NATO 1996).
E: Economic
If considered as a single unit, the EU would be the largest economy in the world.
Additionally, the future looks promising due to new states joining that are poorer than
existing states and who have the potential for faster growth rates. The economic arm o f
the EU is the European Council. The European Council recently passed a program called
the Lisbon Strategy in which the E U ’s stated goal is to have the worlds most dynamic and
competitive economy by 2010 (Ahtisaari, 2002).
The economic variation data enclosed in Appendix II can be used as a gauge for
standards o f living among members. The data is projected data for 2006 and at first
glance seems to highlight a large disparity in GDP, especially in GDP per capita between
member and non-member states. However, when the data is taken together with the
Lisbon Strategy, Turkey would seem to be a perfect fit. Turkey has huge potential for
growth in almost every economic factor considered. Additionally, with over 30 percent
o f its population o f 70 million below the age o f 18 there is a huge labor force available.
Much o f the policy effort o f the EU's economic arm is in the development and
maintenance o f the open single market. The EU strives for harmonized standards, equal
entry to markets, and protecting the rights o f all workers. One o f the most integral
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aspects o f the EU for new members is the structural cohesion fund that is designed to
develop disadvantaged regions and economies.

Turkish Foreign Policy
D: Diplomatic
The government o f Turkey is a parliamentary system in which the president is
elected by the legislative branch to a seven-year term. The president, who has limited
powers and abdicates party membership upon election, appoints the prime minister and
has the power to summon sessions o f parliament, promulgate laws, and ratify
international treaties. The prime minister, who supervises the implementation of
government policy, usually is the head o f the majority party. The present constitution
was adopted in November 1982 and amended in 1995, 1999, 2001, and 2004. Power is
highly centralized at the national level. The government chosen in 2002 was the first
since 1991 to be formed by a single majority party, the Justice and Development Party.
As o f late 2005, that party retained strong public support. The power of Islamist parties
has increased, despite the principle of strictly secular government (Pope 2004).
The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) exercises legislative power, a
one-chamber parliament composed of 550 deputies who serve five-year terms. The
TGNA writes legislation, supervises the Council of Ministers, and adopts the budget.
In 2004 a major focus o f Turkey’s foreign relations remained the United States
and Western Europe. Relations with Greece, a long-time antagonist, began to improve in
1999. Although the two countries’ still have a fundamental dispute over Cyprus, in 2004
Turkey gained Greece’s support and the endorsement of the Council of Europe for
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membership in the European Union (EU), pending negotiation of a series o f domestic
reforms. Relations with the United States, close since the beginning of the Cold War,
were damaged in 2003 when Turkey refused to allow U.S. troops to cross into Iraq from
Turkey. The United States canceled a major aid package, which later was restored in a
smaller form. Relations improved in 2004 and 2005, and the United States continued
advocating Turkey’s membership in the EU (LOC, January 2006).
Beginning in the mid-1990s, relations with Israel have been unusually close for an
Islamic nation, based mainly on Israeli military and security assistance. In the past few
years, Turkey has cultivated closer relations with Syria, although a dispute remains over
distribution o f water from the Euphrates River. Close relations have not been established
with Iran, aside from a natural gas supply agreement. Despite reservations about Kurdish
autonomy in Iraq, in 2005 Turkey expressed readiness to establish relations with a new
government in that country.
I: Information
Turkey has a wide variety o f domestic and foreign periodicals expressing diverse
views, and domestic newspapers are extremely competitive. The media exert a strong
influence on public opinion. The most popular daily newspapers are Sabah, Htirriyet,
Milliyet, Zaman, and Yeni Asir. O f those titles, Milliyet (630,000) and Sabah (550,000)
have the largest circulation. Milliyet and the daily Cumhuriyet are among the most
respected newspapers. Most newspapers are based in Istanbul, but also have editions that
run in Ankara and Izmir. The High Board of Radio and Television is the government
body overseeing the broadcast media. Media ownership is concentrated among large
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private companies, a factor that limits the views that are presented. The largest media
operator is the Dogan group, which in 2003 received 40 percent o f the advertising
revenue from newspapers and broadcast media in Turkey. In 2003 a total o f 257
television stations and 1,100 radio stations were licensed to operate. O f those licensed, 16
television and 36 radio stations reached national audiences. In 2003 22.9 million
televisions and 11.3 million radios were in service (LOC, January 2006).
M: Military
Turkey’s armed forces, the second largest in NATO, are mainly made up of
conscripts commanded by professional lifetime soldiers. In 2005 the army had 402,000
active personnel, the navy had 52,750 active personnel, and the air force had 60,100. O f
the active personnel, about 391,000 were conscripts, mainly in the army. In addition,
some 379,000 were in the reserves and 150,000 in the National Guard. Turkey
contributes troops to several United Nations and NATO peacekeeping operations as well
as maintaining a significant force in Turkish Cyprus. In 1998 a major expansion o f the
domestic arms industry began with the aim of withstanding an arms embargo such as the
one imposed by the United States in the mid-1970s after the Cyprus conflict. The
Ministry o f Defense nominally controls the military, but in fact the chief o f the General
Staff is the most powerful figure in the military, and he enjoys substantial autonomy
(LOC, January 2006).
In 1996 Turkey signed two military cooperation agreements with Israel, making it
the first Muslim country to establish such a relationship with that country. Between 1996
and 2002, military and economic ties between the two countries got significantly better.
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The two nations shared training exercises and intelligence information and cooperated on
joint security and weapons projects. However, in the past few years Turkey has
condemned Israeli actions against Palestine, causing a setback in the relationship. In 2005
Israel and Turkey signed a new round of joint military production agreements. Turkey
was a coalition member o f the United States-Ied war on terrorism, sending 1,000 troops
to Afghanistan in 2002 and taking command o f N A TO ’s International Security
Assistance Force there in 2002 and again in 2005. However, because o f the Kurdish
situation Turkey blocked U.S. troop movement into Iraq at the onset of Operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2003. In 2002 Turkey was granted an advisory role in military operations of
the European Union (EU). In recent years, nearly all of Turkey’s arms acquisitions have
been from EU countries or Israel (LOC, January 2006).
E: Economic
Turkey's economy suffered from high inflation and high fiscal deficits from 2001late 2002. Those conditions improved somewhat in 2004, when private investment
increased significantly and the inflation rate declined. Beginning in 1999, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has exerted strong pressure to reform the economic
system. The IMF responded to Turkey’s serious economic crisis o f 2001 with stand-by
assistance programs contingent on reduced state spending and debt, banking reform,
accelerated privatization, and reduced inflation (LOC, January 2006).
For most o f Turkey's modern history the government protected domestic
industries by imposing import trade restrictions. In the 1970's they began to liberalize
that policy and by the 1990's trade with the EU began to increase on a yearly basis.
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Turkey was admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. In 1996 a
customs union was established between Turkey and the EU, abolishing tariffs on
industrial products for both sides. The level o f trade with the United States generally has
increased since the late 1990s. In 2004 the United States accounted for 7.7 percent of
Turkey’s exports and 5 percent o f its imports (LOC, January 2006).
Foreign direct investment has been relatively low, with the exception of the EU,
and is one o f the main target variables for the government in the near future. The total
for 2004 was about US$2 billion. A reform o f foreign direct investment laws in 2003
streamlined procedures and improved the investment climate. A US$1.5 billion power
plant near Iskenderun, completed in 2004 by the STEAG utilities company of Germany,
is the largest direct investment ever by a German company in Turkey. Automotive
companies from France, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and the United States have plants in
Turkey. In 2005 a Japanese consortium will begin building a railroad tunnel under the
Bosporus. The United States-based General Dynamics Corporation has invested
substantially in fighter plane (F-16's) manufacture in Turkey (LOC, January 2006).
With a historical knowledge o f Turkey and our DIME model survey o f the U.S.,
the EU, and Turkey our next step is to look polling data and interview summaries before
we tackle at two o f the most pressing issues ahead for Turkey: Cyprus and the Kurds.

P ollin g D ata
Secularism is defined as the indifference to or rejection or exclusion o f religion
and religious considerations. T. N. M adan’s speech “Secularism In Its Place,” which
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looks at minority secularism in India, makes the argument that secularism is not a bad or
anti-religious surge; it is merely the best way to logically separate what inevitably
becomes a conflict o f interest. Madan offers that the resistance, regardless of religion, is
understandable from the perspective o f the religious leaders either because they truly
believe they are just and right or because they see a dissolving o f their power base. From
the point of view o f the subjects as they may become disillusioned as to the meaning of
life, he uses the Rig Veda quote from the king to the priest, “Turn thou unto me so that
we may u n ite...” as an early form of that justification. Madan looks to science as the one
true answer, and we can trace this back to A taturk’s original vision. What we see in
Turkey, from my perspective, is a country that truly keeps coming very close to making
the secular state work and then not quite fulfilling this vision.
Secularism has been the defining feature of the modern Turkish state. Turkey’s
journey to modernization has not always been smooth. As discussed earlier in this paper,
during the 83 years that the country has existed the military has stepped in three times to
overthrow the current government: once in 1960, a second time in 1971, and a third time
in 1980. Each time the military has stepped in it has been to stop the party in power from
moving away from secularism towards a religious government. In recent times there has
been a swing towards a more Islamic society, but this swing is always a minority despite
polling data that suggests a resurgence of Muslim schools and teachings.
As stated at the outset, the future of any country lies in its next generation. I
would like to now take a look at the religious beliefs of college students in Ankara and
use that as a discussion for a larger discussion of Turkey’s future.
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M utlu’s 1996 article based on polling data of college students in Ankara in 1978
and again in 1991 was designed to examine several major issues. The overall goal of the
article is to answer the question: “Since Turkey is a predominantly Muslim
country.. .how will it integrate itself into the European community?” (Mutlu 1996)
Since “religious values are mostly assumed to be a major determining factor of a value
system in any society.. .we need to see the way Turkey experiences Islamic beliefs”
(Mutlu 1996). There are many interpretations of Islam, that is, how the faith o f Islam
deals with science, literature, and basically all things modern. M utlu defines several of
the more predominant approaches:
•

•
•

•
•

Reactionary approach- believes that an inherent conflict exists between science
and religion. Muslim people must obey the “essential elements and rituals of
Islam only, rejecting the modern way of life as seen in many European
countries” (Hoodbhoy 1991).
Secularist Approach- advocates for a separation of church and State and says
that there is no inherent conflict between science and religion (Mutlu 1996).
Conciliatory Approach- people in favor of this approach interpret the Q ur’an and
argue that it does value science saying that nowhere in the Qur’an is there
anything that is contradictory to science (Mutlu 1996).
Reformist Approach- “the advocates of this approach argue that unless Islam
experiences radical reforms Muslim countries cannot progress” (Mutlu 1996).
Epistemological Approach- advocates of this approach value the main teachings
of the Q ur’an and argues that that must control moral knowledge. They further
say that Modern science as it currently exists is a product o f Western values
(Mutlu 1996).
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T able 2: M utlu Data R eligiosity Scale

TABLE l : Operational definition o f r eligiosity scale» and percentage o f the 19 78

and 199 ! subjects who agree )T disagree
Disagree

Agre e

I TEMS
1978
N

1991
N

1978
N

1991
N

God really exists.

288
54%

458
81%

231
43%

68
12%

T here is a Day of Resurrection

342
64%

432
77%

170
32%

92
16%

I believe there is a Heaven and a Hell,

193
36%

423
75%

332
62%

106
19%

The Q u r’an conveys the command of God

255
47%

434
77%

271
50%

87
16%

211
39%

148
26%

323
60%

367
65%

317
59%

395
70%

203
38%

121
22%

343
64%

369
66%

179
33%

137
24%

In daily life, 1 give every sort of decision
according to the principles stated in the
Q ur’an
On the day of judgm ent everybody will give
an account to God
Religion is a search for truth arid beauty

.
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T ab le 3: M utlu D ata-O p eration al D efinition o f D em ocratic V alues

TAB! ,E I I : The operational definition o f democratic values, and percentage o f

the subjects who agree or disagree (1991 sample)
Agr ee

Disagree

N

%

N

%

It is ii rit necessary for a woman to wear a
heads carf In order for her to be able to say
that si ic is a Muslim

345

61

203

36

Fcma e university students must be allowed
to we; i t headscarves as part of their
reltgk ms beliefs

350

62

206

36

Only dusllrns. will go to Heaven (Negative.
item)

217

38

308
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his/her daily life even if he/she does not
believe in God

350

62

174

31

Good people who are not religious will go to
Heavi

282

50

216

38

You c an not be a truly good person unless
you ai e also a good Muslim (Negative item)

230

41

319

57

Religi ous minorities (Christians) in Turkey
must 1t>e allowed to worship freely

459

81

92

16

I n ore ler to be a developed country Turkey
must emphasize science more than religion

335

59

178

31

Politic;al decisions must be made in
aceorciance with Islamic principles
(Nega live item)

189

33

351

62

Seculi i i ism must be continued in Turkey

376

67

147

26

Some parts o f Islam should be modernized
and r<^cognized to meet the needs of people
in the 20th century

321

57

192

34

I f is. n r v s c ih tf ' fr v r a n ^ r « i n t n h p h a n n v i n
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Mutlu used the polling data to determine which approach was most prevalent in
Turkey today. He found that with respect to religious socialization, the 1991 students
were more religiously oriented than the 1978 students by a margin of 67% to 52%. “In
particular, belief in God, the Day of Resurrection, the existence of Heaven and hell, and
the day o f judgm ent... were more likely to be accepted by 1991 students than 1978
students. Consequently, it can be stated that religious socialization in accordance with
the essential elements o f Islamic beliefs is becoming widespread among the university
students in Ankara” (Mutlu 1996).
With respect to the degree of democratic orientations the questions were designed
to see if there had been an increase in fundamentalism or religious discrimination
between the two polls. Several interesting observations were made; for example, ‘belief
in G od’ did not seem to have any relation to ‘individual happiness’ by most people.
Additionally, in the 1991 data, 62% agreed with questions that had a positive tone and
58% disagreed with items with a negative tone, indicating a more positive tone overall
towards issues. Overall the data in table II shows that the students polled “mostly reject
living by the Sha’ria law, as practiced in several Muslim countries” (Mutlu 1996). It also
showed that with respect to religious socialization Turks have a democratic manner of
going about it. So despite the increase in religious socialization there was not a high
propensity o f discrimination or fundamentalism noticed in the data (Mutlu 1996). In
summary M utlu finds that although Islam is more widespread in Turkey now than twenty
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years ago, the younger generation is much more accepting and respecting o f people not of
their faith.
M utlu’s conclusions constitute a huge part o f this paper; namely, can the form of
Islam adopted by the Turks work, and would it be an asset to the European Community?
According to Mutlu, the answer to the above question is yes. Mutlu sees the possibility
o f two paths a Muslim society can take: “(1) secularization, and (2) the insistence that
there should be a return to a more pristine form o f Islam. Turkey has embarked on the
road toward secularization, relegating Islam to the private, rather than political, sphere of
life.” Although Islam will most likely become more widespread over time in Turkey, it is
not necessarily a bad thing as long as the form o f Islam practiced is one o f tolerance and
acceptance and is maintained in a democratic manner. Ultimately M utlu concluded that
Turkey could integrate well into the European Union because, although they are choosing
to be Muslims, they are also choosing “humanitarianism and democratic orientations as
opposed to fundamentalism and discrimination.”(Mutlu 1996)
Polling data taken by students at the Bagazici University centered more on the
Turkish public and its significant subgroups opinion on membership to the EU. I chose
this selection o f data because it asked some key questions regarding secularism and its
politics. This poll was wider in scope and targeted people in the target age of 18-45+
both in urban and rural settings. From the outset it is important to note the main
independent variables from this poll (Carkoglu 2002).
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T able 4: P olling D ata o f Certain V ariables
Low

M oderate

N ationalism (feelings of)

11%

44%

45%

R eligiosity

29%

45%

26%

Religious (tolerance)
Skepticism (tow ards
Europe)

12%

34%

54%

19%

43%

37%

Pro-E uropean A ttitudes

22%

50%

28% .

: V ariable

.

High

The polling data show the majority of Turks favor EU membership in answering the
question: “How would your life change?” While 20% said it would get worse, 38% said
it would stay the same and 42% said it would get better. In a related question— “Is the
EU a ‘Christian Club’ or do Muslim countries like Turkey have a place in the EU?”—
49% o f respondents said it was a “Christian Club”, 42% said Muslim countries like
Turkey have a place in the EU and 9% had no idea (Carkoglu 2002). Two further
questions help to tease out the complexity o f these responses and make sense o f the
relationship between the economic and religious perception o f the consequences o f EU
membership. First: "What will be the two most important benefits of joining the EU for
Turkey?" The number one answer with 52% was "Economic development, decrease in
unemployment and cost o f living." Second: "What will be the two most important
disadvantages o f joining the EU for Turkey? The top two answers on this one, both at
50% are "Weakening o f religious values," and "Weakening o f national identity"
(Carkoglu 2002). My conclusion is that Turks generally feel uncertain and
apprehensive. While the Turks do generally feel that life will be better if they join the
EU as far as economic opportunity and prosperity are concerned, they are fearful it will
cost them in both national identity and religious values. I sense an unstated belief by
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many Turks that Europeans view them as outsiders rather than potential fellow
Europeans. This is likely justifiable, considering the very different historical context of
Turkey and Europe. Turks may wonder if Islam would be welcome or even compatible
with a Christian EU, and they may wonder if they will eventually have to abandon Islam
in order to assimilate.
As a side note, I thought it would be interesting to include two questions from an
April 6-9, 2006 CBS poll on religion in the United States (N=899 adults nationwide).
T a b le 5: P o llin g D a ta on Q u e stio n Im p o rta n c e
Mot Im portant
Q uestion
H ow im portant is religion
15%
in your daily life
Q uestion
less than
G enerally speaking, do
you think the Islam ic
24%
religion encourages
violence...other religions
around the w o rld ”

__________________________________
1 Som ew hat
E xtrem ely
59%

26%

about the: sam e

m ore than

30%

46%

Comparing Table 4 and 5, 45% o f Turks and 59% o f Americans felt that religion was
somewhat important and 26% of both answered that religion was very important. This
highlights the actual similarities between the two countries on feelings about religion. In
any country, it is the small percentage of extremists or fundamentalists who shout the
loudest or blow themselves up which then make it onto Fox News and Al-Jazeera. And
this media coverage results in other countries assuming that those extreme views are held
by a majority o f citizens, when in fact those citizens may not be any more religious than
the citizens of the nation the extremists have targeted.

Interview Data
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While studying policy documents is useful to understand the course a country’s
government has set, and polling data is equally useful to reveal how the government
policy is perceived by and affects the average citizen, it is perhaps even more important
to be able to speak to the people who either make or influence government policy on a
daily basis. The standard used for this section was an interview by the Peninsula Press of
Turkish Prime M inister Erdogan from December 2006. I then took the same questions
that were asked o f the Prime Minister and posed them to Mr. Fatih Yildiz, the First
Secretary from the Turkish embassy in Washington D C . I also asked the same questions
o f the head Turkish desk officer on the US Joint Staff as well as the Office o f the
Secretary o f Defense. The interview data can be found in Appendix III, and I have
summarized the interviews below.
The primary interview questions used by the Peninsula Press interviewer were
over several general topics: EU resistance to Turkish membership, potential EU
contributions by Turkey, the EU characterization as a “Christian club”, Turkish
workforce migration, and the role o f Turkey in the region. In reading the Prime
Minister's interview and analyzing notes from the First Secretary the one word that came
to my mind was pride. The Turkish are a very proud people; they believe in their country
and see the strengths that they can bring not only to the EU but the world.
In general both the Turkish gentlemen interviewed still had faith in the EU
process and believed that Turkey was progressing along a path that many other countries
had taken before. They felt that many of the reforms needed were already in place.
There was a downplaying o f EU resistance by saying it was really on a country-by-
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country basis and that the vast majority o f Europeans want Turkey to join. With respect
to the religious aspect both expressed the opinion that the EU was not a “Christian club”
but rather a union o f values. Overall the Turkish Prime Minster and First Secretary were
optimistic but reiterated that in some aspects of the EU, the EU needs to decide what it
really wants. Turkey is making the necessary reforms but will not play the game if the
rules are changed halfway.
The US policy makers were for the most part less optimistic about the same set of
questions. They saw European resistance as a much bigger issue that the Turks did.
They agreed it was on a country-by-country basis but some o f the countries against EU
membership, like Austria, hold considerable weight in the EU. Additionally, despite the
potential long term “pull” affect o f workers towards Turkey with EU accession,
Europeans aren’t happy about the potential short-term influx of workers. Overall, US
policy makers agree that Turkish EU accession is probably 10 years away and for now
they are content to simply keep the process moving forward.

M ajor Issues to E U A ccession
Resolution o f the Cyprus and Kurdish issues would go far towards a positive
outcome for the Turkish application to join the EU. Turkey's accession to the EU would
allow it to leverage two key aspects o f its society for the greater good o f the region and
the world: its “Europeanism” and its Muslim society. Being part o f the EU would allow
the country to advocate for moderation and change from the position o f not only pointing
to its own success but also the ability to actually help make change. For this to happen
Turkey, and other key players, must confront several keys issues openly and fairly.

67

Cyprus
Figure 6 : C yprus
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The major players in this centuries old conflict are Turkey, Greece, and as one
might suspect Great Britain. Both Greece and Turkey have claims to Cyprus that date
back to the 2nd century A.D. Both the Greeks and the Turks have ruled the island for
large periods of time. Turkey seized control of the island while it was the Ottoman
Empire in 1571. In 1878 the British took administrative control of the island in a deal
signed with the Ottoman Empire that said the British would use their influence and power
to protect the Ottomans from Russia. The Christian Greek-speaking inhabitants o f the
island saw this as an opportunity to lobby the British for the island’s rightful return to
Greek rule (The British did not consider the idea but they also did nothing to quell Greek
aspirations o f autonomy). Britain annexed Cyprus in 1914 and it later became a colony
in 1925. By the end of World War II the Greek Cypriot population grew to 78% o f the
total population and again a movement for "enosis," or union with Greece, began.

68

Violence broke out between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1954-55 over
increasing Greek aspirations to rule. In 1960 Cyprus was granted its independence from
Britain under a plan guaranteeing minority rights to the 18% Turkish population. In 1964
UN peacekeeping forces were required as the Turkish population felt alienated by the
Greek appointed President Archbishop Makarios. In 1974 Greek army officers overthrew
Makarios and appointed pro-enosis President Nikos Sampson. Fearing this would lead to
union with Greece, the Turks invaded, occupied the northern one-third of the island, and
forced 200,000 Cypriots south, allegedly to protect the Turkish minority. In 1975,
despite international efforts, Turkey declared a Turkish-Cypriot Federal state in the
occupied North and then in 1983 declared the territory the Turkish Republic of North
Cyprus (The Economist, April 15th, 2006).
The Greek-Cypriot portion of the island has always benefited from a more robust
economy and tourist trade, while the Turkish-Cypriots have suffered from an influx of
immigrants from Turkey and a large military footprint. The Greeks desire a UN
guaranteed independence and freedom of movement throughout the island, while the
Turks want to maintain the partition and a bi-national federation. (Henze, 1992)
The EU has made clear that Turkey’s problems with Cyprus would have to be
resolved before Turkey would be considered for membership in the EU. Cyprus joined
the EU as a divided island in 2004. The Greek-Cypriot government in the south is
officially recognized but the Turkish northern government is only recognized by Turkey
and is currently under a trade embargo. The EU has demanded that Turkey open its ports
and airports to all EU members by the end o f the year. The Turks have agreed to this, in

69

kind, but have refused to ratify the treaty because o f one of the newest members o f the
EU: Cyprus. The Turks see a fundamental unfairness for them to have to open their ports
to EU trade while the Turkish-Cypriot side is still under an embargo. The obvious
answer would be to do both at the same time (open up ports and lift the embargo), but the
EU has said that Turkey must open its ports first, not without some gentle prodding from
another EU member, Greece (The Economist, April 15th, 2006).
In Turkey’s opinion the EU is asking them to keep their word when the EU in
fact has a less than stellar record on keeping its word. In early 2004, the two parts of
Cyprus voted on a UN peace plan, and the Europeans said there would be rewards for
those who accepted the plan. The Greek-Cypriots who rejected the plan were rewarded
with EU membership a week later, and are now in a position to veto Turkish
membership. The Turks who accepted the plan are still subject to an embargo, have not
received any o f the reward promised them, and are still denied membership in the EU
(The Economist, April 15th, 2006).
Although it is impossible to turn back time and it tends to be pointless to rehash
past mistakes, I feel that when the EU allowed Cyprus to join the EU without first solving
the Turkish-Greek issue it knew full well the problem was not solved but rather
postponed. Since Greece was already a member of EU there was ample pressure put on
the EU to let Cyprus join. It is my opinion it was the Greek governm ent’s plan all along
to have Cyprus join and then press Turkey for concessions if they wanted to joint the
club. On September 20th 2006 the President o f Cyprus Greek Cypriot Tassos
Papadoplois said before the UN "Cyprus is not causing problems for the accession of
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Turkey to the EU, on the contrary, we were among the first countries to say- and I repeat
now- that we strongly support the orientation o f Turkey toward Europe...but a very, very
important consideration is that Turkey fulfill its obligation towards the EU and Cyprus"
(International Herald Tribune, 20 Sept 2006). This statement reflects what I believe is
the general opinion with respect to Cyprus, that is that the Turks are in the wrong and
need to open up their ports and solve the issue before EU accession can continue.
The Turks feel general betrayal over Cyprus and refuse to have the carrot o f EU
membership dangled in front o f them. The EU must realize it needs Turkey to become a
member o f the EU and it cannot allow the Greeks to try to settle old scores now that it is
a member o f the club. If nothing else, Europe should realize the Turks will not accept this
behavior. If the EU is serious about Turkey joining the EU, it should recognize and
attempt to ameliorate the historical tensions between Turkey and Greece. Turkish
popular support for EU membership has fallen from over fifty percent in 2004 to well
under forty percent currently, and with the Turkish national elections a year away the turn
towards nationalism over EU accession cannot be far away (The Economist, April 15th,
2006).
If the EU ’s desire is to admit countries that provide economic opportunity and the
potential for growth, Turkey is the right choice. The coming year will bring the issue of
Cyprus to a head; we must hope the EU chooses to find a solution instead o f choosing
sides. Ultimately it comes down to the question o f what kind of Europe the EU wants.
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Kurds
F igure 7: K urdistan
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If the Cyprus issue is one that Turkey needs to solve with others, the Kurdish
issues is one it needs to solve primarily within itself, but as we will see it cannot do so
without the help o f other nations. The Kurds', today numbering about 25 million strong
worldwide have long referred to themselves as the largest nation without a state. The
majority of their former land lies in present day Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. In the
modern era, in my opinion, there is one predominant reason that the Kurds have not been
allowed to separate and form their own country; oil. If one were to look at the
highlighted area on Table 6 that marks the boundaries of the Kurds and then superimpose
oil deposits in that region, the two would almost overlap. O f course Turkey, Iraq, Syria,
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and Iran do not want to lose their sovereign territory, but mainly they do not want to lose
the economically viable oil deposits under the land the Kurds claim.
Under Ottoman rule the Kurds were allowed to exist in the eastern third o f the
country as long as they maintained themselves in a feudal society o f a dozen o f so
independent tribes. As long as no attempt was made to unite against the empire they
were allowed to exist. After World War I there was originally a treaty between the
Ottoman Empire and the victorious powers that was unduly unfair to the Ottomans. One
o f the provisions o f the treaty called for the establishment of a separate Kurdistan.
Ataturk used the treaty as the final straw to launch his takeover of the government. Upon
his victory Ataturk negotiated another treaty, the Treaty o f Lausanne, which gave the
aforementioned Kurdish lands to the Turks. In the early days o f the Turkish republic
Ataturk went out o f his way to ensure the Kurds had freedom of religion and local
autonomy, but when the Kurds began to push for full autonomy Ataturk,. who had just
seized control o f the government, feared for the stability o f the region and violently
quelled the movement. By 1930 most of the revolts had been crushed and countless
murders o f Kurds by the Turkish security forces were justified with a stroke o f the
national governm ent’s pen. This would be the trend, off and on, for the next fifty years.
The period between 1930 and 1980 was marked by one law after another designed
to tighten the noose around the Kurds. The litany o f repression is lengthy: fines for
speaking Kurdish, renaming o f Kurdish villages to Turkish, renaming the Kurdish people
in Turkey to 'mountain Turks', and the banning of foreign travel to the Kurdish regions.
The Turkish government never believed that their ultimatum to the Kurds of
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“assimilation or genocide” would not work. What this treatment created instead was the
PKK or Kurdistan Workers Party, a pro-Islamic Marxist rebel group that emerged in the
Kurdish region o f Turkey in the 1980's and which has turned the south-eastern part of
Turkey into a war zone. The region is mired in poverty and only 1 in 14 Kurds has a
primary school education.
Paramount to understanding the Kurdish issue within Turkey is first realizing that
the PKK and the Kurds are not one in the same. I have already mentioned the PKK in
name but a little more history will explain how they fit into the Turkish question.
The PKK was founded by nineteen 'Kurdistan Revolutionaries' in November of
1978. A man by the name of Abdullah Ocalan dominated the meeting and ultimately
became the organization’s leader. The PKK's main goal was a free and separate
Kurdistan. The means o f attaining that goal was through terrorism. Ocalan operated in
Turkey for only one year as he was forced to flee to Syria in 1979 by the social-democrat
government of Prime M inister Bulent Ecevit. Ocalan was finally forced to leave Syria in
1998 when the Turkish government gave the Syrians an ultimatum to turn Ocalan over or
suffer potential reprisal from the Turkish military. After bouncing around several
European countries Ocalan was finally apprehended in Kenya by Turkish secret police
and is currently serving a life sentence in Turkey. Although the PKK was officially
terminated by Ocalan him self in May of 2002 the attacks continue and it is still believed
that Ocalan is calling many o f the shots from his cell (Mango 2005).
If the Kurdish question seems complex thus far the problem becomes increasingly
difficult to understand when you add the lines drawn by the Allied Powers at the end of
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World War II and the alliances formed during the Cold War. Why would Syria not only
grant Ocalan asylum but also allow him to run his operation for over twenty years from
their country? The answer to that question has many levels. From the Cold War
perspective the Syrian regime under Asad was reliant on the Soviet Union for arms and
support and in return Asad allowed Palestinian militant groups to live, train, and operate
against Israel— the main US ally in the Levant. In dealing with Iraq Asad supported a
Kurdish leader in the North who was fighting against the Barzani clan— a dominant tribe
in the North supported by the Shah of Iran (and indirectly by the CIA because he stood
against Saddam Hussein). In 1975 the Shah and Saddam made peace and Barzani was
left to fend for him self—this is the same year the Shah was overthrown and the next year
Saddam declared war on Iran. This gave Barzani a chance to come back and he once
again tried to ally him self with the Iranians (this time the Khomeini regime). This time
the US sided with Baghdad seeing them as the lesser of two evils. As time moved on
Barzani continued to survive and in 1983 Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
concluded a co-operation agreement with O calan’s PKK. We can see from the above that
the various PKK alliances throughout the years have had multiple levels and one can
rarely take things on face value (Mango 2005).
The way ahead for the Kurds in Turkey is also tied to Turkey's accession to the
EU. The EU is pushing for human rights reforms in Turkey that for the most part deal
with the Kurds. The Turks, to their credit, do have portions of their government that are
desperately trying to make a better life for the Kurds but there are various conspiracy
theories that abound in Ankara. One o f the most prevalent is that it is actually the
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military that continues to fuel the Kurdish problem because they don't want the EU
accession to happen. This theory runs that the military sees closer ties to Europe vis-a-vis
the EU as a possible infringement on their power over the government. No longer will
they be able to step in when they see things wandering away from the secular vision of
Ataturk. The military sees that a more open, Western, modern Turkey would play more
into the hands o f the pro-Islamic parties hands and less into theirs.
Despite these conspiracy theories Europe must understand the frustration that has
been felt by Turkey over the years as many governments in Europe have looked the other
way as PKK factions have set up cells in their countries— content to turn a blind eye as
long as the terrorists focused their efforts outward. France, Belgium, Spain, and
Germany all have documented reports by their own intelligence agencies noting the
existence o f PKK and Islamic terrorist organizations within their borders, but as long as
the intelligence assessment was that these terrorist organizations were planning actions
outside o f Europe nothing would be done. This precedent existed until 9/11. Post 9/11
doctrine has changed things a bit but we are still not at the point where all democratic
countries are cooperating against terrorism and agree that a terrorist threat against one
democracy constitutes a threat to all democracies (Mango 2005).
The Turkish government is moving forward with addressing its Kurdish problem.
The EU and U.S. would be better served to realize that they themselves had a hand in
creating this problem. All things aside Turkey is going to do what it must in order to join
the EU for two main reasons: the U.S. wants it to join, and there is momentum to do so.
Perhaps one thing that would help the Turks and the Kurds solve their problems is to

76

remember the words o f the seven-time prime minister o f Turkey, Ecevit: “ Yesterday was
yesterday, today is today” (Pope 2004).
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion
Turkey has always existed as a place “in-between.” Its place in history as a
crossroads between East and West is still very much relevant today. The Turks are a
proud people and the legacy o f the Ottoman Empire, if nothing else, commands respect
from a size and longevity standpoint. But what is the signilicance o f Turkey today?
Why is Turkey important? Turkey again stands at a crossroads as it looks west to join the
European Union and continues to secularize and modernize, but also looks east to the
world o f Islam for its religious values. The strategic significance o f Turkey may no
longer be as a buffer on the Black Sea to keep the Russians in check, but the country has
gained a new global significance as a test case for the sustained success o f a secular
Islamic state. Turkey is a country that is modernizing at a rapid rate but also has issues
that must be resolved.
From the outset this thesis had as a mission to explain to the reader why Turkey
matters. The best metaphor for Turkey’s current situation is the perpetual tipping point.
To make the argument the reader was first exposed to a theoretical exploration of
secularism followed by a concise history of how contemporary Turkey came to be. With
that solid foundation the reader was then exposed to three-part applied research
consisting o f DIME analysis, polling data, and interview data. The DIME analysis shows
us Turkey’s potential and ability to compete at all levels on the world stage. The polling
data gave us insight as to what is on the minds o f that one-third of the population that is
below the age o f 18 - they are looking to the West with more tolerant eyes and more
capitalist minds. Finally, our interview data solidifies the fact that the Turkish
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government is doing what needs to be done, on their terms, to meet the requirements set
by the EU.
Turkey’s position in the world demands a flexible, progressive, and understanding
foreign policy position from the US and the EU. The West must understand it is easy to
make the comment that "we need the more moderate practitioners o f Islam to stand up
and advocate for a solution in the region,” but not quite as easy to put it into practice.
Turkey’s foreign policy as well as its position on internal conflicts must continue to work
toward cooperation with the West that will be in its own self-interest. Turkey must
continue to work towards a solution to its outstanding issues and must do so to the
standards set by the international community, but the international community must work
with Turkey and help it down that path instead o f making the road more difficult. On
every level— economically, culturally, militarily, or politically— a strong and
democratically sound Turkey benefits Turkey, the EU, the U.S., the region, and the
world. And ultimately, in this religiously charged political atmosphere, the West should
do everything in its power to encourage a successful integration o f Turkey into the EU
and the wider world so that it can continue to serve as a role model for other Islamic
nations. Turkey must be seen to be a strong Islamic country that nonetheless has found a
way to provide viable economic opportunities for its people, without being seen as a
lackey o f the West. This proud and independent country deserves nothing less.
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Appendices
Appendix I: Shared Vision Statement
Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American
Strategic Partnership
I. Shared Vision
The relationship between Turkey and the United States is characterized by
strong bonds o f friendship, alliance, mutual trust and unity o f vision. We
share the same set o f values and ideals in our regional and global
objectives: the promotion of peace, democracy, freedom and prosperity.
Thus, Turkey and the United States face common challenges and
opportunities that demand our concerted efforts. These challenges and
opportunities form the specific items of our common agenda for
consultation and cooperation.
We agree to translate our shared vision into common efforts through
effective cooperation and structured dialogue.
Turkey and the United States pledge themselves to work together on all
issues o f common concern, including promoting peace and stability in the
broader Middle East through democracy; supporting international efforts
towards a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including
international efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis
o f a two-state solution; fostering stability, democracy and prosperity in a
unified Iraq; supporting diplomatic efforts on Iran's nuclear program,
including the recent P5+1 initiative; contributing to stability, democracy
and prosperity in the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, Central Asia and
Afghanistan; supporting the achievement of a just and lasting,
comprehensive and mutually-acceptable settlement o f the Cyprus question
under the auspices o f the UN and in this context ending the isolation of the
Turkish Cypriots; enhancing energy security through diversification of
routes and sources, including from the Caspian basin; strengthening
transatlantic relations and the transformation o f NATO; countering
terrorism, including the fight against the PKK and its affiliates; preventing
WMD proliferation; combating illegal trafficking o f persons, drugs and
weapons; increasing understanding, respect and tolerance between and
among religions and cultures; and promoting together effective
multilateral action to find solutions to international challenges and crises
o f common concern.
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The United States strongly supports Turkey's accession to the European
Union and the access process now underway.
Our consultation and cooperation will also include enhanced bilateral
relations with particular emphasis on economic and commercial relations
and investments; defense/military cooperation; science and technology;
and public diplomacy efforts and exchanges.
11. Structured Dialogue
Turkey and the United States make use o f several consultation channels at
various levels. It is now time to develop a more-structured framework to
make our strategic partnership more effective and results-oriented.
In addition to the established High-Level Defense Group (HLDG),
Economic Cooperation Partnership Council (ECPC) and Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) consultation mechanisms, we
envisage four mutually-reinforcing tracks:
a) Expert-Level Consultations: They will be held as frequently as
appropriate on issues o f common concern.
b) Policy Planning Consultations: Regular meetings will be held between
Policy Planning Units to analyze tendencies, trends and developments
from a strategic perspective, and to offer recommendations, as appropriate
in terms o f policies to be pursued and means to be employed.
c) Broad-Based Dialogue: In our determination to enhance and diversify
the scope o f our relationship, we will actively promote bilateral exchanges
among business groups, media, civil society, scientists and engineers,
academicians and think-tanks, and educators and students. We will also
facilitate opportunities for dialogue between the U.S. Congress and the
Turkish Grand National Assembly
d) High-Level Review: We will conduct a review at the level o f Under
Secretaries at least once a year to provide comprehensive and timely
assessment and guidance.
Finally, the Secretary o f State o f the United States and the Foreign Minister o f Turkey
will remain in regular contact as required to develop this shared vision and structured
dialogue.

Appendix II: EU Projected Economic Data for 2006
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Appendix III: Interview Data
Transcript of Interview with Turkish Prime Minister, Turkish Embassy First
Secretary, US Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense Turkey Desk
Officers
Note: The Prime Minister's comments are in quotes when I have taken them verbatim, the First
Secretary comments, due to the limitations of my interview, are based on my notes,
Turkish Prime Minister (PM), First Secretary (FS), Joint Staff/Office of the
Secretary of Defense (JS/OSD)
Q: There is broad resistance to Turkish membership o f the EU. Why do you think
this is?
PM: "When Turkey is the case, some circles in the EU prefer to see the glass
always half empty. Turkey has gone through a comprehensive reform process that has
been frequently referred to by many EU leaders as a "silent revolution."
The EU with its motto "unity in diversity" has the aim of embracing all countries
willing to join the Union with the condition that it fulfills the necessary criteria. Turkey
is just one of those countries aiming to become a full fledged member."
FS: Resistance is really on a country-by-country basis. The majority o f EU
countries are keen to see Turkey as a member for all the various contributions we can
make. The big question before the Union as it looks to Turkey is what kind o f an EU
does it want. The EU must also look to deepen if it is to enlarge; often times there are
conflicting opinions within the EU on the form that will take.
JS/OSD: Significant prejudices exist throughout Europe. The long history of the
guest worker program throughout Europe has left a bad taste in the mouth o f even the
most liberal states. European populations are also nervous about the future and the fear
that the expansion will hurt their economy by including developing countries
Q: What contributions do you believe Turkey can make to the EU?
PM: "Turkey since the year 2002 has been the fastest growing economy among
the OECD member countries. If we also take into consideration that one-third of
Turkey's population is below the age of 18, it becomes evident that Turkey has huge
economic potential.
Turkey is the only candidate country that has a customs union agreement with the
EU. The 10 new members that have joined the EU on May 2004 did not have a customs
union agreement with the EU. Turkey's foreign trade with the EU amounts to nearly $82
billion annually.
From another point o f view, it goes without saying Turkey is not only a bridge
between Europe and Asia, but also a country which is at the intersection o f many
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important trade and natural resource routes. In the future, Turkey's role in providing
natural resources to the European market will increase significantly. Turkey as a leading
country in its region will also contribute to the EU's common foreign and security
policy."
FS: Turkey is already contributing to the EU via its customs agreement. EU
accession will broaden the already established markets and open new ones. Turkey has
vast untapped resources at its disposal and is eager to take the next step.
JS/OSD: In the long term a western oriented Turkey will be a stabilizing
influence in the region, both for the EU markets and for the world in the strategic sense.
Q: Will Turkey become the first Muslim nation to jo in the largely Christian EU?
PM: "The EU is not a Christian club. It is a union o f values that oversees the
prevailing democracy, the supremacy of law, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms
and a free market economy. Turkey, as a candidate country that will soon start accession
negotiations, shares the same fundamental principles that constitute the backbone o f the
EU. It is a fact that the EU will evolve in time. Change is an inevitable reality. Turkey
as a country is willing to become an EU member that will adapt itself to the dynamics of
the EU in the same way as the other countries that joined the EU before Turkey."
FS: Again an echo of the fact that the EJJ is not a Christian Club. While there is
some country-by-country apprehension to Turkey as a Muslim nation it is important to
keep the fundamental tenants of the EU as a whole in sight. With that in mind, Turkey,
with its secular constitution and democracy, is on the right path.
JS/OSD: Too soon to tell although we are probably looking at a 10-15 year
solution. The pro-Turkey camp is hoping for now that the train will still be on the track
at the end o f December 2006.
Q: Some Europeans have nightmares about millions o f unemployed Turks
roaming freely across the E U and undercutting wage levels. How valid a concern do you
see this being?
PM: "By the time Turkey becomes an EU member the economic conditions
within Turkey will be much better. Another important point is that the unemployment
rate in Turkey is not very different than that of the EU member states. Furthermore, the
free movement of labor will not go into force immediately when Turkey becomes an EU
member. There will be transition periods. Fear is the result of a lack of knowledge."
FS: The fear o f a Turkish version o f a Diaspora or Turks living in Europe is
understandable considering the large numbers of Turks currently in Europe. EU
accession will not exacerbate the problem; on the contrary, it will allow Turkey to

86

industrialize at a faster pace and thereby not only grow its own workforce but ultimately
have a potential pull effect from Europe.
Q: What kind o f a role do you see Turkey playing in the relations between the
West and the Arab world over the coming years?
PM: "In today's world o f globalization all nations are becoming increasingly
interdependent on each other. Therefore, it is not possible to have stability and security
confined only to certain areas.
Geographically, Turkey is both a European and Middle Eastern country.
Politically, on the other hand, we belong to the Western world. We have been part o f the
Western political system from the very outset, while maintaining a special and
multifaceted relationship with the Arab world with which we have close historical and
religious ties.
As a result, Turkey today has the comparative advantage o f understanding the
motives and aspirations o f those in the Arab world, as well as the approaches and
principles upheld by the West. Now that both parties are seeking a better functioning
dialogue between themselves, Turkey's potential to contribute to this endeavor is even
more significant."
FS: Turkey is a relatively young country with strong ties to history. The military
has an enormous amount o f pride that can be traced back through Ataturk and the
Ottoman Empire. The country also has strong religious ties to the Muslim world. Most
importantly Turkey is a secular state with a thriving and working democracy—made
stronger by its history, not despite it.
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